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To support this claim, I have constructed a range of security policies that run on real workloads 
automatically, modeled their overheads using architectural simulations, explored tradeoffs in policy 
design and engineering to reduce their costs, and finally characterized them by their security properties. 
As examplar policies, I have created stack and heap memory protection policies that can thwart 
traditional memory corruption vulnerabilities. Additionally, I have built a compartmentalization framework 
that allows a security engineer to automatically generate and evaluate a wide range of tag-based 
compartmentalization strategies. To generate compartments automatically, the framework includes 
algorithms for quantitatively minimizing overprivilege and packing the rules required for those policies 
into manageable sets that can be cached favorably for high performance. Across these three categories 
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Tagged architectures have seen renewed interest as a means to improve the security and
reliability of computing systems. Rich, programmable tag-based hardware security moni-
tors like the PUMP [43] allow software-defined security policies to benefit from hardware
acceleration. The thesis of this work is that policies for programmable tagged architectures
(1) can be engineered to enforce critical security properties at low cost, (2) can protect real
programs running on real ISAs, and (3) can be applied automatically to programs—that is
with compilation passes or automatic analysis—so that the benefits of such an architecture
can be brought to existing and new software with minimal human intervention.
To support this claim, I have constructed a range of security policies that run on real
workloads automatically, modeled their overheads using architectural simulations, explored
tradeoffs in policy design and engineering to reduce their costs, and finally characterized
them by their security properties. As examplar policies, I have created stack and heap
memory protection policies that can thwart traditional memory corruption vulnerabilities.
Additionally, I have built a compartmentalization framework that allows a security engineer
to automatically generate and evaluate a wide range of tag-based compartmentalization
strategies. To generate compartments automatically, the framework includes algorithms
for quantitatively minimizing overprivilege and packing the rules required for those policies
into manageable sets that can be cached favorably for high performance. Across these
three categories of policies, I present the following policy engineering contributions: (1)
lazy tagging, an optimization that reduces the cost of tagging memory objects, (2) rule
packing, a technique for relaxing policies in key ways to improve their performance, and (3)
rule prefetching, a technique that can exploit predictable rule sequences by preemptively
fetching and installing rules before they are needed.
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CHAPTER 1 : Introduction
1.1. Motivation
Conventional computing systems are highly insecure. Substantial portions of their soft-
ware stacks, including operating systems, device drivers, runtime environments, and web
browsers, are written in languages such as C, C++, and assembly. These languages have
seen widespread adoption in the systems development world due to the precise low-level
control that they expose to programmers and their fast execution speeds, but they are
also notoriously insecure. Notably, they lack array bounds checking, they rely on manual
memory management which can lead to use-after-free and double-free errors, they permit
undefined behavior which compilers may exploit to unexpectedly remove security checks
or do other surprising code transformations [130], they employ complicated implicit type
casting rules and expose low-level architectural behavior (e.g., integer overflows) that may
lead to hard-to-detect bugs in application logic—and the list goes on. Repeated studies
have shown that essentially all software contains bugs [15, 60, 88], and bugs in programs
written in unsafe languages produce executable artifacts that may violate language-level
abstractions (such as isolating memory objects from each other), thus paving the path for
attackers to manipulate computing systems to malicious and devastating ends.
Many security properties of programs that could be enforced to prevent these kinds of
errors (or at least mitigate their malicious effects) have been identified in the literature.
For example, memory pointers created to reference objects should not be permitted to
access memory outside of the object’s bounds; when a machine transfers control-flow from
one instruction to another, the edge taken should be in the expected control-flow graph of
the program; when an operation takes place on or between objects, the operation should be
valid in terms of the types of the objects; errors in one component of a system should not be
able to affect other unrelated components—many other such properties could be described.
Despite the security community both knowing these properties and how to enforce them—or
1
at least relaxed versions of them—on critical software, they have not been widely deployed
to protect computing systems; one of the key reasons is that the overheads imposed by
enforcing them are deemed to be too high to justify their benefits. For a defense to be
used in practice, it must sit favorably in the performance cost versus protection tradeoff
space. The few mitigations that have seen widespread adoption, such as stack canaries [33],
address space layout randomization (ASLR), and Write-XOR-Execute memory permissions
(W⊕X), not surprisingly, are all mitigations that do not impose substantial overheads.
As the cost of transistors goes down, the opportunity to invest hardware resources to accel-
erate security policies becomes increasingly viable. With hardware support, the acceptable
points in the protection-versus-overhead tradeoff space can shift favorably towards stronger
mitigations. In this dissertation I focus specifically on a software/hardware co-designed
programmable tag-based hardware security monitor, the Programmable Unit for Metadata
Processing (PUMP) [43]. In this architecture, the CPU maintains a metadata tag on each
word of memory in the system, on each register in the register file, and on the program
counter. As each instruction executes, a software security monitor is consulted. It inspects
the tags relevant to the instruction, determines if the operation should be permitted ac-
cording to a specified policy (or policies), and if so, supplies tags for the results of the
operation. To accelerate the behavior of the security monitor, the CPU maintains a cache
of the recently encountered rules—properly designed [42], such a cache can be consulted in
a single cycle without stalling the CPU. This means that policies can be enforced at low
costs as long the rule locality is high i.e., misses in the rule cache are rare.
To be useful, that is to identify and halt invalid or malicious executions, the PUMP must
be provided with a software-defined policy (or set of policies) expressed in a fine-grained
and low-level fashion suitable for the PUMP: we call such policies micropolicies. This
dissertation is about the construction and engineering of useful micropolicies.
While previous research has shown that micropolicies can be formulated and proven to be
correct for abstract symbolic machines [11], this dissertation takes a pragmatic approach.
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Concretely, (1) it models policies on a full and real RISC ISA and deals with the nuances
of real architectures and compilers, (2) it pays heed to the overhead imposed by the en-
forcement of policies by modeling a concrete PUMP with a finite rule cache, a limitation
that influences policy design, and (3) it is concerned with policies that can be applied auto-
matically—that is, with compilation passes or automatic analysis, so that minimal human
intervention is required to bring the benefits of the PUMP to existing and new software.
1.2. Outline
Chapter 2 covers the background material for this dissertation. It introduces the PUMP
architecture and the C-based threat model that our policies are built to protect against.
Chapter 3 is about policies for protecting the program call stack; its contents are drawn
from a published paper on the topic [106]. The runtime stack is a critical system component
with a long history of being exploited by attackers [5]. The call stack serves as a storage
repository for a range of uses to support the abstraction of a function call. In memory
unsafe languages, attackers can tamper with data items stored in the stack to hijack the
control-flow of the machine or otherwise maliciously manipulate or read program data. The
chapter presents three stack protection policies that secure the stack abstraction at various
levels of protection and costs. The goal of the policies is to carry forward information
available to the compiler about correct program behavior (such as which instruction should
access which fields of a frame) and to enforce them at runtime with tags and rules. The
first policy, Return Address Protection, is designed as a lightweight and simple policy; it
uses tags to protect return addresses stored in stack memory by limiting access to them
to just the compiler-generated instructions explicitly emitted for stack management. The
policy has an overhead of only 1.2% and provides protection comparable to stack canaries.
The chapter then presents two richer policies that protect all stack objects—to do so, these
policies (1) insert instrumentation to tag all stack elements as stack frames are pushed and
popped from the stack, and (2) tag program code to communicate the expected behavior of
those instructions such that they can be validated at runtime. Most of the overhead of these
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policies comes from the cost of tagging and then clearing stack memory—consequently, we
investigate optimizations for lazily tagging and clearing stack memory to reduce these costs
while still providing object-level protection of all stack elements. With these optimizations,
the stack protection policies impose an overhead of only 3-4%. The chapter concludes
with an attack taxonomy to characterize the security properties of the policies and their
optimizations.
Chapter 4 presents policies for protecting the heap, a source of dynamic memory. In manu-
ally managed languages such as C/C++, programmers must explicitly allocate and deallo-
cate memory objects by invoking a software component called an allocator. Manual memory
management of this form is notoriously error prone, introducing new error classes such as
use-after-frees and double-frees that can also lead to memory corruption. Heap-based ex-
ploits have become very popular among attacks against real systems [17], even overtaking
other kinds of memory errors in recent years [127]. To protect the heap, we introduce poli-
cies based upon the dynamic tainting and checking technique introduced in [30]. In these
policies, the allocator is modified to tag the memory chunks that it allocates with a color
identifier, and also to tag the pointer it returns to the program with the same color. On
each memory access performed by the program, the color of the pointer is compared against
the color of the memory word, and if they do not match then the access can be determined
to be illegal and a violation is raised. Unlike the stack policies, programs do not require
instrumentation to benefit from the protection of the heap policies. The range of heap
policies we present vary only in their coloring schemes i.e., how many identifiers are used
to differentiate allocations and how they are assigned to those allocations. We introduce
a simple One-Color policy that can protect against a range of common vulnerability types
with an overhead of only around 1%, as well as an Infinite-Color policy that provides com-
plete spatial and temporal memory safety for heap memory at a higher cost 37% (although
for many workloads the overhead is less than 10%). Between these two extremes, we explore
several other variations and additionally how the Infinite-Color policy can be relaxed in key
places to reduce its costs while maintaining as much protection as possible.
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Chapter 5 is about compartmentalization policies. Compartmentalized systems are more
robust to attacks than monolithic systems, because when a breach occurs the attacker is
constrained to just the data and privileges available in the compromised compartment. In
this chapter we present SCALPEL, a tool for automatically compartmentalizing systems
and enforcing those compartments with tags and rules. In the first phase, SCALPEL
uses a tracing policy to record the set of fine-grained privileges required by a program to
perform its tasks, including both control-flow transitions and memory access patterns. The
tracing policy is implemented as a drop-in policy replacement, allowing to run on the same
software and hardware without any other system changes. After running the tracing policy,
SCALPEL then uses the tracing data to systematically generate a wide range of possible
system decompositions. To generate its decompositions, SCALPEL treats compartment
generation as an optimization problem over the privilege-performance space. To produce
high-performance compartmentalizations, SCALPEL targets the number of rules that are
needed by a program during any of its phases and packs those rules down into manageable
sets that can be favorably cached. To decide how to relax the decompositions to achieve its
rule targets, it introduces a quantitative privilege representation and uses overprivilege as
an objective function to minimize. At the extreme, SCALPEL can target packing an entire
compartmentalization policy into a set of rules small enough to fit into the rule cache, thus
achieving no runtime rule misses and the predictable performance profile required for real-
time systems. Lastly, a final optimization used by SCALPEL is a rule prefetching system.
When a program enters a compartment, many of the rules that will be required by that
program can be predicted in advance, which means they can be installed preemptively to
avert future misses. We show that prefetching can reduce the overhead costs of fine-grained
separations by almost 4X, allowing tighter separations to run at lower overheads.
The common thread throughout the chapters is policy engineering, i.e., the design of security
policies that achieve useful security properties while managing the number of tags, rules,
and other runtime costs for enforcement. In the stack policies, the dominant source of
overhead arose from tagging and clearing stack memory, which we solved with the lazy
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tagging and lazy clearing clearing policy designs. In both the stack and the heap policies,
we found that generating unique identifiers for each dynamic stack frame or each heap object
could challenge the rule cache, and a possible policy design strategy to reduce costs is to
map identifiers to static entities, i.e., Static Authorities for the stack and the Allocation-
Site policy for the heap policies. For the compartmentalization policies, we introduce rule
packing, a technique in which the set of rules required for each program phase is packed into
a set that can be cached favorably. Lastly, we design and evaluate a rule prefetching system
that exploits predictable rule sequences to reduce the number of runtime rule resolutions.
1.3. Contributions From Others
The stack work in Chapter 3, including both the stack policies and the lazy tagging opti-
mization, was done by me under the guidance of André DeHon.
The initial N-Color heap policy implementation in Chapter 4 was developed by Udit Dhawan,
which I then refined substantially. The Allocation-Site variations and the security charac-
terization were done by me.
The compartmentalization work in Chapter 5 began as a joint effort between myself, André
DeHon, and Nathan Dautenhahn, in which the privilege representation model, the privilege
quantification model, and compartmentalization algorithms were developed. The transla-
tion of the compartmentalization framework from Linux to FreeRTOS and the development
of a tag-based back-end, as well as tracing policy, rule packing, syntactic constraints and
prefetching were done by me and advised by André. The tag-based framework was sup-
ported by Arun Thomas and Chris Casinghino at Draper Laboratory and was built on top
of the PIPE framework that was developed there.
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CHAPTER 2 : Background
2.1. The PUMP Architecture
Classic Von Neumann computing architectures do not differentiate between code and data,
nor do they track any other kind of metadata or typing information about internal ma-
chine state. Tagged architectures, broadly speaking, aim to increase the robustness of the
machine by binding tags to pieces of internal state such that those tags can be taken into
consideration to validate the machine’s operations, e.g., to assure that data is not inter-
preted as code and executed. Early uses of tags trace their histories back to the 1960s; in
1973 Feustel [50] proposed using tags for typing data elements stored by a machine, with
types such as int, bool, vector or linked list. With increasing hardware resources as a result
of Moore’s Law, the number of bits that can be allocated for tags as well as the complexity
of the tagging hardware has increased over time [38, 128, 55].
The PUMP [43] architecture, the focus of this dissertation, generalizes prior tagged archi-
tectures by providing software-programmable, but hardware-accelerated metadata processing
over tags of unbounded size and complexity. The programmable nature of the PUMP is
important for several reasons: (1) the complete set of security policies that one might want
to enforce is both unknown and evolving in response to new threats, and (2) it permits
deployments to configure tradeoffs by updating the software—this allows a single hardware
mechanism to accommodate diverse end-user requirements, which may change depending on
the security requirements, overhead tolerance, attack-surface exposure, policy compatibility,
and even the individual application.
The core idea is that a full word-sized tag is indivisibly associated with each word of data
in the system, including on each word of data in memory, on each register, and also on the
program counter. As each instruction executes, the tags on the inputs to that instruction
are used to validate that instruction against a software policy. The policy interprets the
tags, decides if the operation is legal, and if so, it provides new tags for the output of that
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instruction. The amount of metadata held in a tag is unbounded: the tag can be treated
as a pointer to an arbitrary data structure, which can compose data from multiple different
policies to permit the enforcement of an arbitrary set of security policies (e.g., CFI, memory
safety).
There are up to six inputs to each instruction: (1) the instruction’s opcode (e.g., add, load,
jump), (2) the tag associated with the program counter (PC), (3) the tag on the instruction
itself (CI), (4-5) the tags on the register inputs (R1, R2), and (6) the tag on the word of
memory (M), if the instruction is a load or store. Each instruction may produce up to two
outputs: (1) an new tag on the program counter (PC ′), and (2) a tag for the result of the
output of the instruction (MR), whether it is a memory word or register. For compact
short hand, a policy may be written as a collection of rules of the form:
Op : (PC,CI,R1, R2,M)→ (PC ′,MR)
While this function of six inputs to two outputs is restrictive compared to the entire set of
tags in the full machine state that a security monitor might want to consider and modify
in the general case, it is still highly expressive and importantly lends itself well to high-
performance implementations: it (1) restricts where input tags can come from to simplify the
hardware and (2) means that rules, that is, mappings of inputs to outputs, are manageable
in size. This is important, as the core accelerator of policies is the PUMP rule cache, an
additional, on-chip hardware store of the recently encountered rules. Properly designed
[42], such a cache can perform a rule match within a single cycle so that the CPU does not
stall if there is a hit in the cache. This means that the policy software runs only as a miss
handler when a rule does not match a rule that is in the cache. When such a miss occurs,
control flow is transferred to the miss handler software, which either computes a new rule
or raises a security violation. If a violation is raised, the OS handles the violation, which
will typically include terminating the offending program. If no violation is raised, then the
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miss handler installs a new rule into the rule cache and returns control back to the program.
A consequence of the rule cache design is that tags are immutable, i.e., tags cannot change
their meaning over time which could invalidate the semantics of a cached rule.
For good performance, this means policies should keep their working sets of rules manage-
able to avoid frequent cache misses. A key thread throughout this dissertation is policy
engineering, which deals with the interaction between policy design and the resulting num-
ber of tags, rules, and thus enforcement costs that arise as a result.
While a naive implementation of the PUMP architecture would double the size of all the
registers and the on-chip caches, architectural optimizations can reduce much of this over-
head [43]. For example, one key optimization is that tags in the L1 subsystem can be
represented with a smaller number of bits, say 10, and then translated automatically back
to longer tags as needed. This allows the L1 data and rule caches to remain much smaller,
reducing the area and energy overheads associated with a PUMP implementation. This
optimization allows the architecture to be closer in costs to shorter tag designs while still
maintaining the full expressive power of word-sized tags.
The PUMP architecture has a close relative, the PIPE architecture, which is used in Chap-
ter 5. The PIPE differs from the PUMP in that it uses a dedicated coprocessor for policy
execution (the PEX core) in addition to the primary application core (the AP core). Fur-
thermore, the PIPE architecture does not change the number of bits used by the host
architecture in order to accomodate tag bits, but instead maintains a “tag map table” that
maps host memory addresses to tag addresses (and maintains a shadow register file).
2.2. Security and Threat Model
While the PUMP is capable of expressing a wide range of security policies, in this dis-
sertation we narrow our focus down to a standard C-based, system-security threat model
for protection evaluation. Software written in languages such as C and C++ comprises a
substantial portion of the trusted code underlying modern computing systems (operating
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systems, device drivers, runtime environments), as well as many widely-used applications
(e.g., web browsers, document viewers, etc). These languages produce executable artifacts
that do not enforce the abstractions present at the language level, such as isolating memory
objects from one another. As a result, programming errors allow clever attackers to corrupt
or manipulate the state of a machine to take control of its operations or steal data from it.
These kinds of errors have been responsible for a large fraction of attacks against computing
systems over the last several decades [1] and continue to be extremely problematic to this
day [47].
Consequently, the threat model for this work is that untrusted input, such as from files or
over a network, may be processed by programs written in languages such as C and C++.
Bugs in these programs may allow an attacker to violate computing abstractions, such as
through buffer overflows, use-after-free errors or double-free errors. The policies presented
in this work, given the programmable nature of the hardware and the rich range of policy
designs, aim to either (1) prevent these kinds of violations entirely, (2) turn a fraction of
bugs from exploitable to unexploitable as other successful mitigations have done [33], or (3)
contain the effects of such bugs to reduce the harm that a bug may cause or increase the
attacker effort/cost required to weaponize such a bug.
These kinds of vulnerabilities are not the only ways in which computing systems can be
compromised. For example, side channel attacks [71] or hardware attacks such as Rowham-
mer [69] can also be devastating; however, these kinds of attack vectors are outside of the
threat model under consideration in this work.
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CHAPTER 3 : Stack Protection Policies
3.1. Introduction
Low-level, memory-unsafe languages such as C/C++ are widely used in systems code and
high-performance applications. Unfortunately, they are also responsible for many of the
classes of problems that expose applications to attacks. Even today, C/C++ remain among
the most popular programming languages [125], and code written in these languages exists
within the Trusted Computing Base (TCB) of essentially all modern software stacks. In
memory-unsafe languages the burden of security assurance is left to the application devel-
oper, inevitably leading to human error and a long history of bugs in critical software.
The program call stack is a common target for attacks that exploit memory safety vulnera-
bilities. Stack memory exhibits high spatial and temporal predictability, it is readable and
writeable by an executing program, and it serves as a storage mechanism for a diverse set of
uses related to the function call abstraction: the stack holds, in contiguous memory, local
function variables, return addresses, passed arguments, and spilled registers, among other
data. The particular concrete layout of stack memory, chosen by the compiler and calling
convention, is exposed. An attacker can wield a simple memory safety vulnerability to over-
write a return address, corrupt stack data, or hijack the exposed function call mechanism
in a host of other malicious ways.
Consequently, protecting the stack abstraction is critical for application security. Currently
deployed defenses such as W⊕X and stack canaries [56] make attacks more difficult to
conduct, but do not protect against more sophisticated attack techniques. Full memory
safety can be retrofitted onto existing C/C++ code through added software checks, but at
a high cost of 100% or more in runtime overhead [90]. These expensive solutions are unused
in practice due to their unacceptably high overheads [123].
Recent work has shown that programmable, hardware-accelerated rich metadata tag-based
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security monitors are capable of expressing and enforcing a large range of low-level security
policies [43]. In this model, the processor core is enriched with expressive metadata tags
attached to every word of data in the system, including on registers and on memory. The
hardware propagates metadata tags and checks each instruction against a software-defined
security policy. The same hardware mechanism accelerates any policy (or composition of
policies) expressed in a unified programming model by caching a subset of the security
monitor’s behavior in hardware. Policies can be updated in-field or configured on a per-
application basis.
In this work we develop tag-based stack protection policies for the Software-Defined Meta-
data Processing model (SDMP) that are efficiently accelerated by an architecture that
caches metadata tag rules [43]. We propose a simple policy that utilizes only a few tags,
as well as richer policies that generate thousands of tags for fine-grained, object-level stack
protection. Our policies leverage the compiler as a rich source of information for protect-
ing the stack abstraction. The compiler is responsible for the low-level arrangement of the
stack, including how arguments are passed, how registers are spilled, and where program
variables are stored; consequently, the compiler is aware of which parts of a program should
be reading and writing each item on the stack. In conventional runtime implementations
this information is simply discarded after compilation—by instead carrying it alongside
the data and instruction words in a computation with metadata tags, we can enforce the
compiler’s intent and prevent the machine from violating the stack abstraction at runtime.
Stack protection SDMP policies face two major sources of overhead. The first is the slow-
down incurred by software policy evaluation that must run to resolve security monitor
requests when they miss in the hardware security monitor cache. The rate at which these
misses occur is driven by the locality of metadata security rules, which in turn is driven by
the diversity and use of metadata tags by the policy being enforced. We design our policies
specifically to exploit the regular call structure found in typical programs by reusing iden-
tifiers for the same static function (Sec. 3.3.4) or by the stack depth (Sec. 3.3.4) to achieve
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cacheability of the required metadata rules.
The second significant source of overhead for stack protection policies is the cost of keeping
stack memory tagged, which is a requirement faced by our richer policies. In conven-
tional runtime implementations on standard architectures, stack memory is allocated and
reclaimed with fast single instruction updates to the stack pointer. To tag this memory
naively, we would need to insert code into the prologue and epilogue of every function to
tag and then clear the allocated stack memory, effectively replacing an O(1) allocation
operation with an O(N) one. This change is particularly costly for stack memory; heap
allocations, in contrast, spend hundreds to thousands of cycles in allocator routines, which
makes the relative overhead of tagging the allocated memory less severe.
To alleviate the cost of tagging stack memory, we consider several optimizations. One is an
architectural change, Cache Line Tagging (Sec. 3.5.2), that gives the machine the capability
of tagging an entire cache line at a time. Alternatively, we propose two variations to our
policies that avoid adding additional instructions to tag memory, Lazy Tagging (Sec. 3.5.1)
and Lazy Clearing (Sec. 3.5.3).
Lastly, to characterize our policies, we provide a taxonomy of stack threats (Sec. 3.6.1) and
show how our policies as well as protection mechanisms from previous work protect against
those threats.
The policies we derive in this work provide word-level memory protection of the stack
abstraction, have low overhead (<6%), can compose with other SDMP policies to be accel-
erated with the same hardware (Sec. 3.8.1), interoperate with unmodified library code, do
not require source code changes, and are compatible with existing code and idioms (run on
the SPEC benchmarks).
Our contributions in this work are:
• The formulation of a range of stack protection policies within the SDMP model
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• Three optimizations for our stack policies: Lazy Tagging, Lazy Clearing and Cache
Line Tagging
• The performance modeling results of our policies on a standard benchmark set, in-
cluding the impact of our proposed optimizations
• The protection characterization of our policies and comparison to prior work with a
stack threat taxonomy
3.2. Threat Model and Assumptions
In developing our stack protection policies we assume the same powerful but realistic at-
tacker capabilities of most related work, e.g., [72][35]. In this threat model an attacker
provides arbitrary input to a program that contains a memory safety vulnerability, leading
to adversarial reads or writes into the program address space. As a consequence, any attacks
against stack data are in scope, including control flow hijacking and data corruption or data
leaking attacks. We consider side channels and hardware attacks such as Rowhammer [69]
to be out of scope. In Sec. 3.6.1 we provide a set of specific threats to demonstrate an
attacker’s capabilities within our threat model.
Our policies leverage compiler-level information such as the locations of objects on the stack
and occasionally require adding instructions into programs. We thus consider the toolchain
(the compiler, linker, and loader) to be in our TCB and assume we can recompile programs.
Our policies do not, however, require code changes or programmer annotations.
We develop our policies specifically for the Alpha architecture, a RISC ISA, and use the gcc
toolchain. These choices do impact the low-level stack details used in our policy descrip-
tions and experiments. However, our policies should be easy to port to any RISC ISA; CISC
ISAs would require some more care to handle the more complex memory operations such
as CALLs that side effect both memory and register state. To illustrate typical stack main-
tenance operations under our ABI and architecture, we show a simple annotated function
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main:
lda sp,−32(sp) ; allocate frame
stq ra,8(sp) ; store return address
stq fp,16(sp) ; store old frame pointer
mov sp,fp ; set new frame pointer
stq a0,0(fp) ; write arg for foo()
bsr ra,<foo> ; call foo()
mov fp ,sp ; reset sp before epilogue
ldq ra,8(sp) ; restore return address
ldq fp,16(sp) ; restore frame pointer
lda sp,32(sp) ; release frame
ret ; jump to return address
Figure 1: Typical Alpha stack maintenance code
disassembly in Fig. 1.
3.3. Stack Protection Policies
In this section we describe our stack protection policies. We begin with the motivation for
our policy designs (3.3.1), proceed to connect our mechanism of tags and rules to the stack
abstraction (3.3.2), enumerate the stack invariants that we would like to maintain (3.3.3),
and finally give three concrete policies (3.3.4).
3.3.1. Motivation
Memory errors on stack-allocated objects can allow a program to perform invalid stack
accesses, which attackers exploit to compromise the stack abstraction. To prevent these
violations, our policies tag stack objects with both a frame-id (an identifier for a stack
frame) and an object-id (an identifier for an object within a frame), and tag program code
to allow the machine to validate accesses to these words using appropriate metadata rules.
Formulating identifiers in this way allows us to express a range of policies; we are driven
both by a desire for strong protection (precise notions of object-id and frame-id) and the
performance of our policies (the cacheability of our metadata rules), making the choice
of how we identify frames and differentiable objects inside them core to our designs. In
general, cacheability concerns drive us to avoid creating a unique identifier for each dynamic
procedure call to avoid the compulsory misses that would be required.
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3.3.2. Tags and Rules
The building blocks of SDMP policies are tags and rules. Our policies use tags on (1)
memory words, (2) registers, and (3) instructions. Tags on stack memory words encode a
frame-id and an object-id, which together identify the frame that owns a word and which of
the differentiable objects held by that frame is stored there. The tag on a register may be
either ⊥ (in the case that the register holds a value unrelated to the stack), or it may encode
an allowed frame-id and object-id if it holds a pointer to a stack word. Lastly, instruction
tags are used by the compiler to grant instructions specific capabilities, such as the right to
set the tags on memory words, to set the tags on registers as pointers are crafted, to clear
memory tags, or to perform other policy-specific functionality.
Rules allow us to define the set of permitted operations and describe how result tags are
computed from input tags. For example, to validate a memory access, we can check that the
object-id and frame-id fields on a pointer tag match those of the tag on the accessed memory
word. Furthermore, during such a load, we could use additional fields on the memory word
tag to describe how to tag the resulting value produced by the load. As another example,
we can propagate a pointer tag along with a pointer value as the pointer is moved around
the system (including between registers, to and from memory, and through operations such
as pointer arithmetic) with appropriate rules, allowing us to use the dynamic tainting rules
as in [30] to maintain pointer tags.
3.3.3. Stack Invariants
As a program executes, we would like to verify that objects on the stack are accessed
in ways that the compiler expects with respect to our identifiers; i.e., the object-id and
frame-id accessed by memory instructions match the compiler’s intentions. Several kinds of
accesses capture typical stack behavior (under our ABI and Alpha stack discipline), which
we describe below.
Some stack objects, like return addresses, stored frame pointers and callee-saved values,
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are accessed strictly by code produced by the compiler specifically to maintain the stack
abstraction. These objects are accessed in a highly restricted way: they are written to
the stack once in the function prologue and are read only in the return sequence before
returning control to the caller. Statically the compiler has emitted specific instructions for
these purposes, and so, by the principle of least privilege, we would like to restrict access
to these objects to just those predetermined instructions. For accesses of this variety, we
place the object-id intention directly on the instruction performing the access.
Local stack variables are accessed in two ways. One way is through a fixed offset access
from the frame pointer register. Accesses of this type, like above, allow us to encode the
object-id intentions directly on the instructions that perform the accesses. In this case the
object-id might be Vi, where Vi is an identifier for ith variable belonging to a particular
frame. The second way that local stack variables can be accessed is through pointers held
in general-purpose registers that are crafted by the program. This type of access occurs
when accessing non-scalar types such as arrays, when the address of a local variable is taken
and dereferenced, or when a piece of code obtains a pointer to stack data (e.g., was passed
a pointer to stack local data as an argument). To validate this kind of access, we require
that the accessing pointer was crafted specifically to access the object it is used to read or
write; i.e., it was intentionally provided the capability to access a particular object-id inside
a frame-id. This definition allows a pointer to a specific stack object to be passed as an
argument to another function, but restricts the use of that pointer by the callee to just the
intended object-id and frame-id.
A final class of memory operations used in the stack abstraction is the case of accessing
function arguments themselves. This is a special case—function arguments are held in the
caller’s frame, but no pointer is passed to the callee to be treated as a capability for accessing
them. Instead, the locations of arguments are implicitly dictated by the calling convention,
and the callee will compute an offset beyond its own frame to access the arguments it has
been passed. While we will still use compiler-level information to validate these accesses,
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we leave our discussion of how this is done to each of our concrete policies.
3.3.4. Policies
In this subsection we describe three concrete policies. In each case, we (1) give a high
level description of the policy, (2) describe the implementation, and (3) detail the security
properties of the policy. The rules for each policy written in SDMP notation are available
in the appendix.
We focus on the the core policy behavior in this section—additional details pertaining to
how our policies handle common low-level features and optimizations including setjmp,
longjmp and Exceptions, tail calls, and dynamic stack memory allocations are discussed in
Sec. 3.7.
Return Address Protection
Policy Description: The first stack protection policy we present, Return Address Pro-
tection, is a lightweight policy that is concerned only with control flow hijacking attacks
that overwrite return addresses. It treats return addresses as special objects and restricts
access to words containing return addresses to the specific instructions generated by the
compiler for this purpose (i.e., Sec. 3.3.3). It is designed to have comparable protection
characteristics to mechanisms such as stack canaries [33], shadow stacks [35], or the HDFI
stack protection policy [116], namely the protection of return addresses stored on the stack.
We abbreviate “return address” with RA in our tags and rules.
Because the policy is only concerned with differentiating return addresses stored on the
stack from all other stack objects, it only needs two object-ids: RA and OTHER. As another
simplification, we will not differentiate return addresses by any notion of their owner, thus
choosing to use a single frame-id in all cases. Conceptually, this is equivalent to removing
the frame-id field from the tags for this policy; we choose this interpretation for the rest of
the section. The full rules for the policy are available in Fig 2.
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(1)Store : (⊥,STORE–RA,⊥,⊥,OTHER)→ (⊥,RA)
(2)Load : (⊥,READ–RA,⊥,⊥,RA)→ (⊥,⊥)
(3)Store : (⊥,REMOVE–RA,⊥,⊥,RA)→ (⊥,OTHER)
(4)Store : (⊥, INSTR,⊥,⊥,OTHER)→ (⊥,OTHER)
(5)Load : (⊥, INSTR,⊥,⊥,OTHER)→ (⊥,⊥)
(6)Other : (⊥, INSTR,⊥,⊥,⊥)→ (⊥,⊥)
(6)Store : (⊥,LONGJMP–CLR,⊥,⊥, )→ (⊥,⊥)
Figure 2: Return Address Protection rules
Policy Implementation: This policy requires support from the compiler only to ap-
propriately tag the instructions that store and retrieve return addresses from the stack.
Specifically, the compiler tags the instruction in the function prologue that stores the re-
turn address to the stack with a special tag STORE–RA, which, with an appropriate rule,
causes the written memory word to become tagged RA. Similarly, the compiler tags the
instruction in the function epilogue generated to retrieve the return address from the stack
with a special tag READ–RA. With an appropriate rule, instructions with this tag are
granted the unique permission to read words marked RA from the stack.
In this policy all other memory words are tagged OTHER, and all other instructions are
tagged generically as INSTR. Instructions tagged INSTR are permitted to access memory
words tagged OTHER but not those tagged RA.
One final detail wraps up the policy: in standard stack disciplines, the return address
(which we will have tagged RA) is left on the stack after a function returns. We insert one
additional instruction in the function epilogue that cleans up the RA tag left on the stack
by performing a store to the word containing the return address. This cleanup instruction
is tagged REMOVE–RA by the compiler, granting it the unique permission to overwrite
words tagged RA, which it tags with the generic OTHER.
Security Properties: The Return Address Protection policy uses information from the
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compiler and appropriate rules to keep return addresses saved on the stack tagged RA and
all other words tagged as OTHER. Only specific instructions generated by the compiler to
manage the stack abstraction have permission to access words tagged RA, which prevents
any other code from overwriting them to hijack control flow. Separately, instructions that
load return addresses from the stack require valid RA targets; this prevents an attacker
from tricking the machine into using an attacker-synthesized return addresses, such as in a
typical ROP attack.1
This policy is complementary to CFI policies that restrict the control-flow edges taken by
a program to match those of a control-flow graph. Return edges are imprecise in that they
can potentially return to any of their call cites [2]; the additional protection for return
addresses in memory could replace a shadow stack proposed by [2] for this purpose.
Static Authorities
Policy Description: The next policy we present, Static Authorities, greatly expands upon
the set of object-ids and frame-ids that will be used to differentiate objects on the stack. The
key design decision of the policy is to statically assign a unique identifier to each function
in a program, and to reuse that same identifier as the frame-id for each dynamic function
instance that is pushed onto the runtime call stack. Conceptually, each function will tag the
stack memory that it allocates with its unique frame-id, and instructions belonging to that
function are the only instructions tagged in the appropriate way to access (or create pointers
to) that allocated memory. In this sense, each function in a program is the authority over
the memory that it allocates.
In this policy we enrich our notion of object-ids for precise object protection internal to
a frame. Within each frame we statically assign a unique object-id to each program-level
variable used by that function, including each primitive, array and structure in the frame;
i.e., for each variable Vi belonging to a function f we assign a new differentiable object-id i.
1We note, however, that this simple policy would not prevent sophisticated code reuse attacks, e.g., [27].
Our later policies provide protection for other code pointers on the stack as well.
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Like Return Address Protection, we continue to use additional object-ids to manage the
stack control data, but now we expand the set to include the return address, the saved
frame pointer and callee-saved registers; these other objects can also be used to mount
attacks, e.g., [70, 32]. Due to the restricted way in which these compiler-managed objects
are accessed (Sec. 3.3.3), we reuse the same object-id for them all; we only need to isolate
them from the other program-managed objects on the stack to secure them. Leveraging
this piece of static analysis allows us to avoid unnecessary tag and rule diversity.
At a high level, the implementation is then concerned with (1) tagging stack memory
according to the Static Authorities formulation above, and (2) tagging instructions and
defining appropriate rules to validate accesses to these stack objects to enforce the invariants
(Sec. 3.3.3). The full rules for the policy are available in Fig. 4 and are referenced throughout
the next section. In Fig. 3 we show an example of how the stack memory would be tagged
when our tagging scheme is applied to the code shown. For demonstrative purposes, we
assume the first argument is passed on the stack.
Policy Implementation:
Initialization: To initialize this policy, we tag all stack memory words with a special tag,
EMPTY STACK, indicating that the cell is unclaimed.2 Instructions are tagged with both
their corresponding frame-id (authority identifier) and an instruction-type field that is set
generically as INSTR unless otherwise indicated below. We initialize non-stack memory to
⊥.
Tagging Stack Memory : In each function prologue, a function first tags the stack pointer
with its frame-id using the instruction that decrements the stack pointer (rule 1). Next, the
function uses instructions added by the compiler to tag the freshly allocated stack words
with their appropriate frame-id and object-id. These instructions are tagged with both
the instruction-type SET MEM and the object-id that they are initializing; with rule 2,
2For simplicity, we assume a fixed, maximum stack size, although with additional OS and loader support
stack pages could be allocated lazily and tagged on demand as they are faulted in.
21
long square(long i ){
    long r = i ∗ i ;
    return r ;
}
int main(){
    long x = 3;
    long r ;
    r = square(x) ;
}
 
(a) A simple function to illustrate the Static Au-
thorities tagging scheme. The main function has
been assigned one frame-id (green), and square





main's return address obj-1
main's frame pointer obj-1
main's arg for square obj-2,argfor=square
main.x obj-3
main.r obj-4
(b) The state of stack memory at the time when
square is called by main. In square’s prologue,
it will first tag the stack pointer with its blue
identifier (rule 1), and then tag the stack ele-
ments in the new frame (rule 2). After this tag-
ging is complete, the stack will look like (c).
square's return address obj-1
Data Tag
square's frame pointer obj-1
square.r obj-2
main's return address obj-1
main's frame pointer obj-1
main's arg for square obj-2,argfor=square
main.x obj-3
main.r obj-4
(c) square’s frame is now tagged. When square
accesses a local variable, the tag on the instruc-
tion will be checked against the tag on the mem-
ory word (rules 3 and 4) to validate the access.
The square function will be permitted to read





main's return address obj-1
main's frame pointer obj-1
main's arg for square obj-2,argfor=square
main.x obj-3
main.r obj-4
(d) Before square returns, it will first release
its stack memory by clearing the tags back to
the EMPTY-STACK state (rule 3). The stack
is now in the same state as it began (b).
Figure 3: An example illustrating the Static Authorities tagging scheme. In this example
we show how square’s memory would be tagged when it is called from main, which has
already tagged its memory. The referenced rules are show in Fig. 4
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SET MEM instructions become the only type of instructions that can claim empty stack
memory, which they convert from EMPTY STACK to the appropriate frame-id and object-
id of the allocated word. Functions that do not allocate stack memory (e.g., handwritten
assembly code in libc) tag no memory—they require no stack protection.
Tagging and Propagating Pointers: The compiler places the MAKE-PTR instruction-type
along with the frame-id and appropriate object-id on instructions that create pointers to
stack objects (rule 1). We use the same dynamic tainting rules as in [30] to propagate
pointer tags between registers (rules 6-10), as well as to and from memory (rules 13 and
14).
Accessing Objects: The way in which accesses to stack objects are validated depends on
the access type. For direct frame pointer offset accesses, instructions are tagged with the
instruction-type ACCESS LOCAL and the specific object-id that they access; these accesses
use the frame-id from the frame pointer (rules 4 and 5). For the general pointer case, a
an access is allowed when the frame-id and object-id of the accessing pointer matches the
frame-id and object-id of the stack word (rules 13 and 14).
Retagging the Stack Pointer : After each function call, the compiler inserts one instruction
to tag the stack pointer back to the authority identifier of the caller (rule 1). The frame
pointer gets the correct tag by retrieving the stored frame pointer from the stack memory
in the function epilogue (rule 14).
Passing Arguments: To handle the special case of argument passing, the Static Authori-
ties policy sets aside a special object-id for arguments (ARG) and tags stack words that
contain passed arguments with this special object-id using rule 17. These argument words
are extended with another field, argument for, containing the authority (frame-id) of the
intended consumer. Access to words marked ARG are permitted with rules 15 and 16 if the
accessor’s frame-id matches the argument’s indicated argument for field. The way in which
we tag ARGs with the appropriate authority identifier of the expected callee depends on
23
the type of function call. For direct calls, the needed information is trivially available to
the compiler, and these words can be set up by appropriately tagging the instructions that
prepare the arguments before the call instruction. For indirect calls (in which the callee
authority identifier is not known statically), we add additional fields to keep function point-
ers tagged with their appropriate frame-id, so that at runtime we can setup the argument
words with correct frame-id based on the dynamic function pointer being used. We describe
these details in Sec. 3.7.
Clearing Memory : To clear a function’s allocated memory, the compiler adds additional
instructions into the function epilogue tagged CLEAR MEM that, with rule 3, allow the
program to release the stack memory allocated by the function by retagging the words cur-
rently owned by the function’s frame-id with the tag EMPTY STACK. We choose epilogue
clearing over prologue clearing to limit the writing privilege of each function to just the
memory that it has allocated itself.
For readers interested in additional low-level policy details, the uses of the other rules are
discussed in Sec. 3.7. A reader considered with only the high-level policy behavior may
continue on here.
Security Properties: The Static Authorities policy tags each object on the stack with
a frame-id, indicating which function owns the object, as well as an object-id, indicating
which object held by that frame is stored there. Accesses to stack objects are validated
with compiler assistance, using tags on instructions and pointers. Accesses are permitted
only if the correct frame-id and object-id are used, preventing the out-of-bounds accesses
that give rise to stack attacks; both inter-frame and intra-frame violations are prevented
with the Static Authorities tagging scheme. However, in order to achieve cacheability of
the metadata rules, the policy does reuse the same frame-id for each dynamic instance of a
function. This reuse constrains the number of tags and rules that are generated to remain
modest, i.e., remain proportional to the number of active functions in an application. It
also means that the policy does not differentiate between dynamic instances of a stack
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object; it shares this limitation with systems built on static points-to analysis like WIT [4]
and others [26]. The Static Authorities policy provides both spatial and temporal security
properties—a dangling pointer is still bound to its specific frame-id and object-id.
Non-stack pointers are tagged ⊥, which prevents them from accessing stack memory. Stack
pointers are prevented from accessing other memory regions, which are tagged ⊥. These
rules prevent gross cross-region violations, including “stack clashes” [103]. Additionally, by
combining these rules with strict epilogue rules that require the stack pointer tag to not be
⊥, the policy protects against stack pivots similar to [101].
Depth Isolation
Policy Description: The last policy we present, Depth Isolation, is constructed in almost
the same way as Static Authorities. However, instead of using a unique function identifier
to serve as the frame-id, the Depth Isolation policy uses the current stack depth, d, as the
frame-id for each function instance—this allows the policy to discriminate between dynamic
instances of a particular stack object. The policy uses the same set of differentiable objects
within a frame as in Static Authorities: that is, a unique object-id for each program variable,
an object-id for stack control data, and an object-id for argument passing.
Conceptually, the system will maintain the current stack depth, d, and all functions will use
it to tag the dynamic instances that they allocate. The full rules for the policy are shown
in Fig. 5.
Policy Implementation: Our Depth Isolation implementation differs from Static Author-
ities in only a few aspects, so we present the differences here. The other implementation
details are the same.
Maintaining Stack Depth: This policy requires tracking the current stack depth to serve
as the frame-id, which we choose to place in the tag on the stack pointer register. In the
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(1)Arith : (⊥, (MAKE–PTR, f, o),⊥, ,⊥)→ (⊥, (f, o,⊥))
(2)Store : (⊥, (SET–MEM , f, o),⊥, (f, ,⊥),EMPTY –STACK )→ (⊥, (f, o,⊥,⊥,⊥))
(3)Store : (⊥, (CLEAR–MEM , f,⊥),⊥, (f,⊥,⊥), )→ (⊥,EMPTY –STACK )
(4)Store : (⊥, (ACCESS–LOCAL, f, o), (f2, o2, p), (f,⊥,⊥), (f, o, , , ))→ (⊥, (f, o, f2, o2, p))
(5)Load : (⊥, (ACCESS–LOCAL, f, o), , (f,⊥,⊥), (f, o, f2, o2, p))→ (⊥, (f2, o2, p))
(6)Arith prop : (⊥, (INSTR, ),⊥,⊥,⊥)→ (⊥,⊥)
(7)Arith prop : (⊥, (INSTR, ),⊥, (f, o, p),⊥)→ (⊥, (f, o, p))
(8)Arith prop : (⊥, (INSTR, ), (f, o, p),⊥,⊥)→ (⊥, (f, o, p))
(9)Arith prop : (⊥, (INSTR, ), (f1, o1, p1), (f2, o2, p2),⊥)→ (⊥,⊥)
(10)Arith no prop : (⊥, (INSTR, ), (f1, o1, p1), (f2, o2, p2),⊥)→ (⊥,⊥)
(11)Store : (⊥, (INSTR, ),⊥,⊥,⊥)→ (⊥,⊥)
(12)Load : (⊥, (INSTR, ),⊥,⊥,⊥)→ (⊥,⊥)
(13)Store : (⊥, (INSTR, ), (f2, o2, p), (f1, o1,⊥), (f1, o1, , , ))→ (⊥, (f1, o1, f2, o2, p))
(14)Load : (⊥, (INSTR, ), , (f1, o1,⊥), (f1, o1, f2, o2, p))→ (⊥, (f2, o2, p))
(15)Store : (⊥, (INSTR, f), (f2, o2, p2), , ( ,ARG , , , ,ARGFOR = f))→
(⊥, (f,ARG , f2, o2, p2,ARGFOR = f)
(16)Load : (⊥, (INSTR, f), , , ( ,ARG , f2, o2, p,ARGFOR = f))→ (⊥, (f2, o2, p))
(17)Store : (⊥, (SET–ARG , f1, f2), (f3, o3, p), (f1,⊥,⊥), (f1, , , , ))→
(⊥, (f1,ARG , f3, o3,ARGFOR = f2))
(18)Arith : (⊥, (CREATE–FP , f, p),⊥, ,⊥)→ (⊥, p)
(19)Store : (⊥, (LONGJMP–CLEAR, ),⊥, , ( , , , , ))→ (⊥,EMPTY –STACK )
(20)Other : (⊥, (INSTR,⊥,⊥),⊥,⊥,⊥)→ (⊥,⊥)
(21)Arith prop : (⊥, (BEGIN –INDIRECT–CALL, f),⊥, (⊥,⊥, p),⊥)→ (p,⊥)
(22)Store : (pc, (SET–ARG–FROM –PC , f), (f2, o2, p), (f, ,⊥), (f, , , , ))→
(pc, (f,ARG , f2, o2, p,ARGFOR = pc))
(23)Jump : ( , ( , INSTR,⊥,⊥),⊥,⊥,⊥)→ (⊥,⊥)
Figure 4: Static Authorities rules
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function prologue, the compiler tags the instruction that allocates the stack frame with
INCR–DEPTH ; (Fig. 5 rule 1), this causes the value held in the tag, d, to be updated to
d+1. Similarly, in the function epilogue, the compiler tags the instruction that releases the
stack frame with DECR–DEPTH, which, with rule 2, replaces the current depth, d, with
d -1.
Argument Passing : Argument passing in the Depth Isolation policy is simpler than in the
Static Authorities policy. We tag stack words that contain arguments with the object-id
ARG and the current depth of caller d (rule 17), but we do not need to extend them with
argument for as was done in Static Authorities. Instead, in the Depth Isolation policy,
we require that the depth of the accessor to argument words is either d, the depth of the
owner, or d+1, the depth that will be used by the callee (rules 18-21); no other depths are
permitted to access arguments.
Other : The Depth Isolation policy does not need to retag the stack pointer after returning
from a call because there is no authority identifier kept on the stack pointer; the depth
decrement by the caller sufficiently resets the stack pointer. In Depth Isolation instruc-
tions have no authority identifier and so are only tagged with their instruction-type on
initialization.
Security Properties: The Depth Isolation policy, like Static Authorities, prevents out-of-
bounds accesses to objects on the stack by requiring that the frame-id and object-id tags
of the instruction or pointer match those of the accessed memory word—and so it has sim-
ilar security properties to Static Authorities. However, the Depth Isolation policy provides
better spatial memory safety properties than Static Authorities, as each live function in-
stance (even of the same static function) has a unique frame-id. The Depth Isolation policy
has weaker temporal guarantees; a dangling pointer tagged for a particular frame-id and
object-id may be able to be used for unintended instances.
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(1)Arith : (⊥, INCR–DEPTH ,⊥, (d,⊥),⊥)→ (⊥, (d + 1,⊥))
(2)Arith : (⊥,DECR–DEPTH ,⊥, (d,⊥),⊥)→ (⊥, (d− 1,⊥))
(3)Arith : (⊥, (MAKE–PTR, o),⊥, (d,⊥),⊥)→ (⊥, (d, o))
(4)Store : (⊥, (SET–MEM , o),⊥, (d,⊥),EMPTY –STACK )→ (⊥, (d, o,⊥,⊥))
(5)Store : (⊥,CLEAR–MEM ,⊥, (d,⊥), )→ (⊥,EMPTY –STACK )
(6)Store : (⊥, (ACCESS–LOCAL, o), (d2, o2), (d,⊥), (d, o, , ))→ (⊥, (d, o, d2, o2))
(7)Load : (⊥, (ACCESS–LOCAL, o), , (d,⊥), (d, o, d2, o2))→ (⊥, (d2, o2))
(8)Arith prop : (⊥, INSTR,⊥,⊥,⊥)→ (⊥,⊥)
(9)Arith prop : (⊥, INSTR,⊥, (d, o),⊥)→ (⊥, (d, o))
(10)Arith prop : (⊥, INSTR, (d, o),⊥,⊥)→ (⊥, (d, o))
(11)Arith prop : (⊥, INSTR, (d, o), (d, o),⊥)→ (⊥,⊥)
(12)Arith no prop : (⊥, INSTR, (d1, o1), (d2, o2),⊥)→ (⊥,⊥)
(13)Store : (⊥, INSTR,⊥,⊥,⊥)→ (⊥,⊥)
(14)Load : (⊥, INSTR,⊥,⊥,⊥)→ (⊥,⊥)
(15)Store : (⊥, INSTR, (d2, o2), (d1, o1,⊥), (d1, o1, , , ))→ (⊥, (d1, o1, d2, o2))
(16)Load : (⊥, INSTR, , (d1, o1), (d1, o1, d2, o2))→ (⊥, (d2, o2))
(17)Store : (⊥,SET–ARG , (d2, o2), (d1, ), (d1,⊥,⊥,⊥, ))→ (⊥, (d1,ARG , d2, o2)
(18)Store : (⊥, INSTR, (d2, o2), (d1, ), (d1,ARG , , , ))→ (⊥, (d1,ARG , d2, o2)
(19)Store : (⊥, INSTR, (d2, o2), (d1, ), (d1 + 1,ARG , , , ))→ (⊥, (d1 + 1,ARG , d2, o2)
(20)Load : (⊥, INSTR, , (d1, ), (d1,ARG , d2, o2))→ (⊥, (d2, o2)
(21)Load : (⊥, INSTR, , (d1, ), (d1 + 1,ARG , d2, o2))→ (⊥, (d2, o2)
(22)Store : (⊥,LONGJMP–CLEAR,⊥, , )→ (⊥,EMPTY –STACK )
(23)Other : (⊥, (INSTR,⊥,⊥),⊥,⊥,⊥)→ (⊥,⊥)






























We model the runtime overheads for our stack protection policies on the SPEC CPU2006
[121] benchmark set running on a simulated metadata-enhanced Alpha microarchitecture.
We compile the benchmarks using gcc with the -O2 optimization level. We allow each
benchmark to complete any benchmark-specific initialization, such as parsing input files or
setting up data structures, and then run it for an additional one billion warm up instructions.
After completing initialization and warm up, we then collect statistics from the system for
a 500M instruction measurement period.
Microarchitecture
For concrete evaluation, we target a single-issue, in-order Alpha microarchitecture with a
unified 512KB L2 cache, a 64KB L1 instruction cache and a 64KB L1 data cache. We use
a wide-word, coupled metadata implementation for tags, so tags are moved atomically with
their associated data words. We simulate a 1024 entry L1 PUMP cache and a 4096 entry
L2 PUMP cache. We use the same basic architecture optimizations as in [43]. Shortened
metadata tags in our L1 cache system are 11 bits, and shortened metadata tags in our L2
system are 14 bits, with full 64-bit tags in DRAM. At these sizes, running with a 1 GHz
clock in a 32 nm process, the L1 and L2 cache access cycles are 1 and 5 cycles for both
the baseline and tagged cases based on CACTI [89] estimates. Cache lines are 8 words and
require 100 cycles to fetch from DRAM in the no-tag case and up to 130 cycles in the tagged
case; since tags live on the same DRAM page with the data, they cost additional cycles for
bandwidth but do not require additional latency for page access or writeback. The main
memory cache compression from [43] means most cache line accesses can fetch compressed
tag descriptions for the cache line and consequently require fewer than 130 cycles to fetch
the data and tags from DRAM.
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Tagging Instructions
Our stack protection policies require tagging individual instructions in policy-specific ways.
Ideally, all instruction tags would be provided by a modified policy-aware compiler. For
our prototyping purposes, we use a custom instruction tagger. The instruction tagger takes
as input the DWARF [54] debug information generated by gcc, which we extract from
the benchmark binaries and process using libdwarf [7]. This debug information gives the
instruction tagger the layout of the stack memory, which it uses to tag instructions as
described by the policies.
Simulation
Our evaluation framework is shown in Figure 6. We use gem5 [18] for architectural statistics
and generating instruction traces, a custom PUMP simulator for simulating the metadata
tag subsystems of the simulated processor, and CACTI [89] for estimating memory access
latencies for the final runtime calculations. After running an initial gem5 simulation of
the application, we process the instruction trace in the PUMP simulator that models the
metadata tags on the registers, memory and program counter, as well as computes the
SDMP policy rules for creating new tags. We then run a separate, second pass of gem5 on
the SDMP software to generate the instruction trace of the misshandler code itself. Finally,
we run a memory simulator to model the memory and rule cache system performance with
a composite trace assembled from the benchmark instruction trace, the misshandler trace,
and the instructions added by the stack protection policies.
3.4.2. Results
Return Address Protection
The Return Address Protection policy has a mean runtime overhead of 1.2% (Figure 7).
The policy needs only 6 static tags and 8 total rules. The small set of rules fits into the
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L1 PUMP rule cache; after the misshandler evaluates and installs each of them into the
cache, no more cycles are spent on policy evaluation. The misshandler took an average of
21 instructions to evaluate a miss. The runtime overhead comes from the one instruction
added to every function epilogue to clear the RA (0.4%) and the additional DRAM cycles
to transfer tag-extended memory words (0.8%).
Static Authorities
The Static Authorities policy has a mean runtime overhead of 11.9% (Figure 8). It generates
an average of 5,213 tags and 12,412 unique rules. The average L1 rule cache hit rate is
99.76%. 13 out of 24 benchmarks experienced no rule misses in the measurement period at
all, and most others experienced very few; only two benchmarks experienced enough misses
to incur a > 1% overhead for resolving security monitor requests. The misshandler took an
average of 46 instructions to evaluate a miss. The high degree of locality of rules results
from a high degree of locality of tags, which the policy achieves by using a single frame-id for
all dynamic instances of a function. This causes the number of tags and rules needed by
the policy to be driven by the size of the working set of active functions (authorities) in the
benchmark. The SPEC benchmarks have an average of 2,507 static functions (including
libraries), but we found that only an average of 399 were called at least once, and only
an average of 93 were active during the core benchmark behavior. A further reduction
in the number of tags comes from a reduction in the number of object-ids provided by
the compiler’s optimizations. Many program-level variables either get allocated strictly in
registers or optimized away entirely, meaning that the actual number of stack-allocated
variables is much lower than would appear from the program source code. The benchmarks
that challenged the rule caches (gobmk, perlbench, gcc) were the ones with large working
sets of functions.
Most of the overhead of the policy (60% of the 11.9%, or individually 7.1%) comes from the
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Figure 8: Static Authorities overhead
memory. As can be seen in Figure 8, this alone accounts for an overhead of more than 60%
for sjeng. sjeng is a chess-playing benchmark that rapidly allocates large 16KB stack frames
that are defensively sized to hold a worst-case number of chess moves, but in the common
case a much smaller number of moves is found and most of the memory goes unused. This
causes our policy to spend many cycles setting up and clearing memory tags unnecessarily.
Most benchmarks that have a high added instruction overhead have a similar root cause.
Some functions in libc exhibit this behavior to a lesser degree, such as IO vfprintf that
contains char work buffer[1000], which is larger than needed in the common case, for ex-
ample. We attribute this pattern to the programmer’s understanding that stack memory is
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Figure 9: Depth Isolation overhead
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Depth Isolation
The Depth Isolation policy has a mean runtime overhead of 8.5% (Figure 9). It generates
an average of 1,127 tags and 3,603 unique rules. It has an average L1 rule cache hit rate of
99.98%. 14 of the 24 benchmarks experienced no rule misses in the measurement period,
and only one benchmark experienced enough misses to incur a >1% overhead for policy
evaluation. The miss handler took an average of 53 instructions to evaluate a miss. The
high degree of locality of rules comes from a high degree of locality of tags, which this
policy achieves by reusing the frame-ids for each dynamic function instance that occurs
at the same depth. This locality emerges from the call graph of common applications;
rarely do the benchmarks traverse a large range of stack depths, allowing the rules for the
depths encountered to remain cached. The benchmarks had an average max stack depth
of 60 (median 18) in the full trace, and an average of 32 (median 8) unique depths in the
measurement period. The benchmark that most challenged the rule caches for this policy
was gobmk, a Go playing program that performs some recursive game state operations. This
policy, like Static Authorities, also exploits the compiler optimization passes that reduce
the number of actual object-ids allocated on the stack. The main source of overhead for
the policy was also the instructions added to tag and clear stack memory (73% of the 8.5%
overhead, or individually 6.2%).
3.5. Optimizations: Lazy Tagging
In the preceding evaluation section, we show that the dominant source of overhead for the
stack protection policies arises from instructions added to tag the stack. Consequently, to
reduce the overhead we focus on techniques that allow us to reduce or remove the need to
add these instructions. Two of the optimizations we present, Lazy Tagging and Cache Line
Tagging, allow us to speed up the policies without changing their security properties. The
last optimization we present, Lazy Clearing, explores recasting the policies from memory
safety policies to data-flow integrity [26] policies in order to remove the instructions that
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clean up stack memory in the function epilogue. When using this optimization, we consider
the policies to be fundamentally different and categorize them separately in our taxonomy
(Sec. 3.6.1).
3.5.1. Lazy Tagging
Asymptotically, an unfortunate overhead of the current policy design is the cost of tagging
stack elements that are allocated but never used. The ratio of used stack frame words to
allocated stack frame words can be arbitrarily small (see discussion about sjeng in Sec.
3.4.2). For the stack elements that are used, the need to tag each with their appropriate
frame-id and object-id means the policies are doubling the stack write traffic for stack
elements that are only written once. Ideally, we’d like to combine the stack tagging operation
with the first program write to the same word to avoid this overhead and simultaneously
avoid tagging unused stack elements.
We can address both of these issues for stack writes with the Lazy Tagging optimization, in
which we allow all stack pointers to write over EMPTY STACK memory and update the
tag on the memory cell to that of the stack pointer or instruction when a write occurs. This
eliminates the need to tag stack memory in the function prologue, and so we eliminate those
added instructions. From a security perspective, we are still assured that stack pointers and
instructions are never used to access claimed (non EMPTY STACK ) stack memory that
does not match the frame-id and object-id of the current instruction and stack pointer. We
keep the full cleanup loop in function epilogues to maintain the invariant that unused stack
frames are marked with EMPTY STACK to allow future function calls to succeed.
A write to the stack beyond the frame’s intended allocation will not be prevented nor
cleaned up, but it will be caught by a frame-id and object-id mismatch when a later func-
tion attempts to use the memory cell. By removing this initialization, we cut the added
instructions roughly in half. When applying Lazy Tagging, the average overhead for Static
Authorities goes from 11.9% to 8.9% and the average overhead for Depth Isolation goes
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from 8.5% to 6.3% (see Figs. 10 and 11).
3.5.2. Cache Line Tagging
Next, and independently from Lazy Tagging, we explore the impact of adding a cache line
wide write operation to the Alpha ISA to perform rapid tagging of memory blocks. We
model a new instruction for this purpose—this is lightweight to add both for the base
datapath and for the metadata rule cache. Typical cache lines are wider than a single
word, and the cache memory can read or write the entire line in a memory cycle, so we are
exploiting capabilities that the cache already possesses.
To avoid complicating the SDMP rule checking, we demand all words in the cache line
have identical tags for this instruction to succeed; this assures the same metadata rule is
applicable to every word in the cache line. The SDMP processor applies the single metadata
rule and writes the result tag to all of the words in the cache line. If any of the tags on
words in the cache line differ, then the instruction instead fails and the machine falls back by
jumping to a displacement encoded in the instruction that contains the logic for handling a
failure—we model this exception handling code as a series of store instructions that write a
value with the same tag as the faulting cache line-wide store instruction would have written.
For this optimization, we align all stack frames to cache lines and model the compiler using
the new instruction for the tagging and clearing of stack memory. While this approach does
not asymptotically remove the burden of stack frame tagging, it provides an 8× speedup in
the best case for the 64-byte cache lines and 8-byte words we assume in our experiments.
This significantly reduces the tagging overhead costs for large stack frames such as those
used in sjeng (See Figs. 10 and 11). We show the impact of both using Cache Line Tagging
alone (for both setup and cleanup) and when it is combined with Lazy Tagging (used just for
cleanup). When used alone, the average overhead for Static Authorities goes from 11.9% to
7.9% and the average overhead for Depth Isolation goes from 8.5% to 5.5%. When combined
with Lazy Tagging, the average overhead for Static Authorities goes from 8.9% to 5.7% and
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the average overhead for Depth Isolation goes from 6.3% to 4.5%.
3.5.3. Lazy Clearing
Lazy Tagging removes the need for adding instructions in the function prologue to claim
memory, but it does not remove the need to clear every allocated word in the epilogue when
a function returns. As a result, the policies are still faced with an asymptotic overhead when
the allocated stack frame size does not match the actual stack frame usage. Removing the
tags from released stack frames is required by the policies so that the subsequent functions,
which use the same stack memory, can claim clean cells tagged EMPTY STACK.
In the Lazy Clearing optimization, we remove the tag cleanup loop in the function epilogue
and allow all stack writes to succeed. This way, future function calls do not experience
violations when they attempt to write over already-claimed memory. When a write occurs,
the memory cell gets the authority and object (frame-id and object-id) for which the write
is intended. When using this optimization, we only validate stack reads, which assure that
the frame-id and object-id of the stack word being read matches the intent of the compiler
as encoded in the instructions and pointers used in the access. Erroneous code can overflow
buffers and write indiscriminantly over the stack memory, but the code tagging rules assure
that any violations to the stack abstraction will be detected by the reading instruction
before the corrupted or unintended data is actually used. Violations that overwrite data
that is never read will not be detected, but that’s precisely because those violations do not
impact the result of the computation since they are not observed. In essence, with this
optimization, our policies provide a data-flow integrity property instead of a memory safety
property.
This change does mean that the tag on a memory cell during a write can now be uncorrelated
to the instruction and stack pointer performing the write. If we needed to supply rules for
all combinations of instruction tags, stack pointer tags, and old memory tags, we could end
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Figure 11: Optimizations applied to Depth Isolation
exploit the ability to indicate that the memory tag is irrelevant to the rule computation
(is a don’t-care), this will not result in an increase in the number of necessary rules. The
don’t-care feature exists in [43], and it turns out to be quite important to extracting the
benefits of Lazy Clearing for some applications.
While running with the Lazy Clearing optimization, we discovered several cases in the
SPEC2006 benchmarks where the original C code does use uninitialized data from the
stack. These are errors, and our policy rules correctly flag these errors as violations. They
allow data to flow from an unintended frame-id and object-id and to be used to effect the
computation. We believe the correct response is to fix these errors in the original code. To
generate a complete and consistent set of data, we selectively disabled lazy optimizations
on just the functions that were flagged as using uninitialized data.
The impact of Lazy Clearing, which we always combine with Lazy Tagging, is shown in
Figs. 10 and 11. When applied in addition to Lazy Tagging, the average overhead for Static





To demonstrate the security properties of our stack protection policies and relate them to
other stack protection work, we provide a taxonomy of stack threats in Figure 12. We select
threats that decompose stack protection mechanisms along the main dimensions in which
they differ and show which protection mechanisms provide protection against each threat.
First, we show whether the protection mechanism prevents the reading of unused stack
memory, where previous functions may have left critical data (security keys, etc). Next, we
show whether the protection mechanism prevents return addresses from being overwritten,
which is the most common vehicle for control flow hijacking attacks. We differentiate
between two kinds of memory safety attacks as in [35], the contiguous case and the arbitrary
case. In the contiguous case, an attacker must access memory contiguously from an existing
pointer (e.g., the attacker controls the source of an unchecked strcpy); in the arbitrary
case, an attacker can access memory arbitrarily (e.g., the attacker controls the source of an
unchecked strcpy and the index into the destination buffer).
Many stack protection mechanisms only protect return addresses. However, many of the
other items stored on the stack are security-critical as well—these include code pointers
such as function pointers, permissions bits, security keys and private information among
many other possibilities, so the last threats in the taxonomy concern accesses to other stack
data. We differentiate read accesses (R) from read/write accesses ( ) to discriminate where
violations are detected and enforced in different policies. Finally, we show the overhead for
each of the protection mechanisms.
3.6.2. Microbenchmarks
Due to the difficulty of porting an existing security benchmarking suite such as RIPE











StackGuard [33] [35] X X X X 2.8%
Parallel Shadow Stack [35] X X X X 3.5%
SmashGuard [96] X X X ∼ 0%
Intel’s Control-flow Enforcement Technology [65] X X X
AddressSanitizer [111] X X X 73%
CPI/CPS [72] X X X 8.5%/1.9%












Return Address Protection (Sec. 3.3.4) X X X 1.2%
Static Authorities (Sec. 3.3.4)
Memory Safety 5.7%
Data-flow Integrity R R R R 3.6%
Depth Isolation (Sec. 3.3.4)
Memory Safety 4.5%
Data-flow Integrity R R R R 2.4%
Read freed stack memory
Contiguous access return address
Arbitrary access return address
Contiguous access wrong stack object
Arbitrary access wrong stack object
Overhead
Figure 12: Stack threat taxonomy
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characterizing our policies. We use a simple vulnerable C program for each of the threats
in taxonomy and craft payloads that allow an attacker to execute the threat shown. Our
system halts the offending program at the expected instruction when we display a in the
taxonomy and does not halt the program when we display X. Note that for the rest of the
security mechanisms in the taxonomy, the or X comes from our understanding of the
work and not an empirical evaluation.
3.7. Policy Compatibility
Supporting setjmp/longjmp and Exceptions: System code written in C, as well as
the SPEC benchmarks, occasionally use setjmp() and longjmp(), in which key program
state (including the PC and frame pointer) is stored to a memory buffer and later restored.
The longjmp() operation causes the machine to pop many stack frames with no unwinding
operations; as a result, all of the discarded memory would remain tagged, which would
later cause our eager policies to encounter violations. To handle this functionality, we add
additional code into the longjmp() routine that includes a store instruction with a special
LONGJMP–CLEAR instruction tag; this tag allows it to overwrite the discarded memory,
which it tags with EMPTY STACK (Fig. 4 rule 19). These stores are violations of the stack
invariants as discussed in Sec. 3.3.3; we are granting additional power to the longjmp()
routine through this special instruction-type. Similarly, C++ exceptions could be handled
by providing additional power to the exception handling code with special instruction tags.
In the Depth Isolation policy, the stack depth d is stored on the frame pointer and retrieved
appropriately by the standard policy rules, so after longjmp() the system again has the
correct depth that was active at the time of the setjmp().
Tail Call Recursion: Tail call and sibling call elimination optimizations allow a program
to reuse a caller’s stack frame for its callee in the special case of tail calls. These optimiza-
tions are activated with gcc’s -foptimize-sibling-calls optimization pass which is included in
the -O2 optimization level. Our policies retag stack frames, as the authority identifer may
have changed. Additionally, arguments prepared for one authority (in the argument for
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field) may be stale for the new authority identifier after a sibling call. To handle this case,
we insert instructions with a special DELEGATE ARG tag that allows an authority to
permanently forgo its access rights and grant them to the sibling authority before making
a sibling call.
Dynamic Stack Allocations: Programs can perform dynamic memory allocations on the
stack using alloca() or by using dynamically sized arrays. We insert additional instructions
to tag this memory at the time of the allocation, and similarly insert additional instructions
to clear the allocated memory when the stack pointer is again incremented. Note that these
setup and cleanup operations are not in the function prologue or epilogue, in contrast to
the tagging operations discussed in the policy descriptions. A current limitation of our
implementation is that we assign the same object-id to all dynamically allocated stack
objects. Dynamic stack memory allocations are very rare in the SPEC benchmarks.
Variadic Functions: The C language includes support for variadic functions, that is
functions that take a variable number of arguments. Another limitation of our current
framework is that we assign the same argument identifier to all such arguments. In future
work, it would be possible to assign identifiers to those arguments based on their argument
number and replace the macros that access those arguments with tag-aware variations for
finer protection.
Supporting Indirect Calls: In this section we explain how we tag arguments for indirect
function calls (as referenced in Sec. 3.3.4). To handle indirect function calls, we track all
function pointers in the system with their corresponding frame-id by extending the tags
on registers and memory words with another field for this purpose. In effect, these tags
identify code locators [84] that may be used for indirect function calls. When a function
pointer is then used for an indirect call, we use its tag to identify the dynamic function that
is being called in order to set up its arguments. Before such a call takes place, we insert
a special NOP instruction tagged BEGIN–INDIRECT–CALL, which, with Fig. 4 rule 21,
takes the frame-id of the register being used by the indirect call (e.g., jsr) and tags the
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Program Counter tag with the frame-id of the dynamic authority identifier. Instructions
that prepare arguments for indirect calls are tagged with a special SET–ARG–FROM–PC
tag and use the authority identifier held in the program counter tag to set the appropriate
argument for field (rule 22). Finally, the indirect call instruction clears the tag on the
PC when it executes (rule 23). In other words, we simply use the function pointer tag to
intialize the argument tags for the correct dynamic function being called, and then clear
the tag state afterwards.
This strategy requires having all function pointers tagged with their appropriate frame-
id. To achieve this, we tag entries held in structures such as Global Offset Table (GOT)
at initialization with their appropriate frame-id ; these tags then propagate when they are
read using rule 14. Function pointers can also be crafted dynamically by a program using
arithmetic instructions that compute at offset from the global register. We extend our
instruction tagger to cover these cases, and tag these instructions with the instruction-
type CREATE–FP along with appropriate frame-id for the function pointer that they are
creating (rule 18). All function pointers used by the SPEC benchmarks are covered by
these cases, although there may be other originating sources of function pointers on other
systems; for a complete discussion on identifying code locators, see [84].
In the rules we show in Fig. 4, we display tags on instructions as pairs of the form
(instruction-type, frame-id), tags on registers as triples of the form (frame-id, object-id,
func ptr) and tags on memory as 5-tuples of the form (frame-id, object-id, frame-id-ptr,
object-id-ptr, func ptr). Tags on memory words require these field so that when a stack
pointer is stored into stack memory, a future load can produce an appropriately tagged
pointer or function pointer identifier (e.g., rule (5)). In some cases we extend fields for
particular instruction-types as required by the policy.
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3.8. Discussion and Conclusion
3.8.1. Related Work
Stack Protection Due to the prevalence of stack memory safety exploits, stacks have been
the subject of many defensive efforts [123]. Traditional protection mechanisms such as Data
Execution Prevention (DEP) and Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR) increase
the difficulty of conducting attacks, but do not prevent them entirely. For example, DEP
does not protect against code reuse attacks such as ROP [113, 24, 92, 115], and ASLR can
be subverted with information leaks [86].
Low-overhead, software-only stack protection solutions such as StackGuard [33] and shadow
stacks [35] protect return addresses, but do not protect other stack data and can be de-
feated by attack techniques such as direct writes and information leaks. Recent work found
that shadow stacks have a performance overhead of about 10% [35]; we include the opti-
mized Parallel Shadow Stack variant in our taxonomy. Hardware support for shadow stacks
has been proposed (SmashGuard [96]); recently Intel has announced upcoming hardware
support for the feature in their Control-flow Enforcement Technology [65].
AddressSanitizer [111] instruments all memory accesses with checks against “red zones” in
a shadow memory that pads all objects. It protects stack and heap objects, but only against
the contiguous write case. It bears a high runtime overhead of 73% and a high memory
usage overhead of 3.3×.
A recent research direction has proposed providing full memory safety just for code pointers
(Code Pointer Integrity [72]). While this technique provides an effective level of protection
for the incurred overhead on commodity hardware, it does not protect all stack data. Recent
work has shown that even non-control data attacks can be Turing complete [63]. The
SafeStack component of this work explores splitting the stack into a “safe stack” and a
“regular stack”. Objects that are accessed in a statically, provably-safe way, such as return
addresses and spilled registers, are placed onto the safe stack. Other objects, like arrays
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and structs, are placed on the regular stack. This spatial separation is useful for protecting
items on the safe stack and additionally has almost no performance overhead; however,
it is opportunistic, protecting the items that can be cheaply protected and, without CPI,
provides no protection for items on the unsafe stack. The safe region itself is protected only
with information hiding on 64-bit systems, and implementations have been attacked [49].
Hardware-Assisted Data-flow Isolation (HDFI) [116] uses a single metadata tag bit for
efficient security checks. This enables it to achieve a low overhead, but with only a single
metadata bit it can only provide coarse protection (e.g., just return addresses or just code
pointers, similar to our Return Address Protection). It can distinguish two classes of data
and make sure that data from one class is not mistaken for data in the other, but cannot
provide fine-grained frame and object separation. Recent work shows that single-bit tags,
such as needed for HDFI, can be added without changing the physical memory word width
by using a separate tag table with low overhead [66]. LowRISC provides two bits of tagging
in its memory system that could be used to implement HDFI with its ltag/stag operations
[82, 119].
Some commercial products are beginning to provide features that can approximate HDFI.
ARM’s v8.3 pointer authentication feature could be used on the return address, or other
code pointers, to detect tampering [80] without the need for separate tag bits. Using a
unique encoding per return point, this can be extended to provide some CFI protection as
well. Oracle’s Application Data Integrity (ADI) could be used to assign one of its 16 colors
to spilled stack frames at a cache-line granularity to serve a similar function to the single
tag bit in HDFI [75]. These offerings are available on commercially available chips, but only
provide protection similar to our Return Address Protection policy.
Like other data-flow integrity models [26], the DFI variants of our policies keep track of
writers to memory words. Instead of using static instructions as writers, our policies use
identifiers for stack objects. In this case of Depth Isolation, we differentiate dynamic in-
stances of the same variable. However, in this work we restrict the policies to just stack
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objects.
Bounds checking approaches such as SoftBound + CETS [91, 90] can provide complete
memory safety using software checks, but are expensive (116% overhead). Hardware support
for bounds checking, such as HardBoud [41], Intel’s MPX [64] and CHERI [134, 29] can
reduce these overheads drastically. Metadata tags are an alternative mechanism that can
provide memory protection, and so this work can be seen as exploring the space of tag-based
policies for memory safety.
SDMP Policies
The stack protection policies we present in this work are complementary to, and can be
composed with, other SDMP policies. Prior work has detailed policies for Control-Flow
Integrity (CFI) [43, 13], Information-Flow Control (IFC) [12, 11], Instruction and Data
Tainting [43], Minimal Typing [43], Compartmentalization [13], Dynamic Sealing [13], Self
Protection [13], and Heap Memory Safety [43, 13]. These previous policies did not address
protecting the program stack. The previous memory safety work [43] [13] only addressed
heap allocated data, where simply instrumenting the allocator was sufficient to build the
policies. As we have seen, object-level stack memory protection is significantly more in-
volved. Interesting future work would be to apply some of the optimizations we describe in
this work, such as the DFI variants of the policies, to previous heap safety policies.
Policy Applicability
Several systems provide programmable, multi-bit metadata tags that could exploit the
policies we derive here [23, 38, 44, 37]. Aries [23] would need to be extended to include tags
on memory. Harmoni [38] lacks instruction tags, but does decode control from instructions;
most of our uses of instruction tags could be replaced with augmented instructions. Here,
Depth Isolation, where ownership comes from depth on pointers, would make more sense
than Static Authorities, which would require authority to be embedded in the instructions.
The original Harmoni design has only two inputs to its tag update table (UTBL), while
45
some of our rules need 3 inputs, beyond the instruction tag, to track tags on both register
arguments and the memory. The SAFE Processor [44] has a hardware isolated control
stack, so does not need to use a metadata policy for protecting procedure call control data.
The policies in this work can be seen as an option to unify stack protection under the
single mechanism of tagged metadata, rather than adding a separate mechanism for just
protecting stack control data. DOVER [37] follows SDMP closely and would be a direct
match for our policies.
Emerging flexible, decoupled monitoring architectures support parallel checking of events
with metadata maintained in a parallel monitor [28, 55, 129]. LBA and FADE [28, 55]
add hardware support to filter and accelerate events with structures similar to the SDMP
rule cache. The accelerators in reported designs do not include accelerated handling for
metadata on the program counter and instructions, but such extensions appear feasible.
As with Harmoni, instruction tags could be handled as augmented instructions. ARMHEx
exploits the ARM CoreSight debug port, added instrumentation code, and programmable
logic to perform tagged information tracking on existing ARM SoCs such as a Xilinx Zynq
[129]. Combining the instrumentation to pass necessary data and programmable logic to
implement tracking and checking, it should be able to implement the stack policies described
here. The Depth Isolation and Static Authorities policies we describe have richer metadata
and are more sophisticated than any of the policies assessed in these monitoring architecture
papers.
3.8.2. Limitations and Future Work
Other variations of policies we present could be constructed. With additional compiler
support, subfield sensitive policies (i.e., object-ids for individual fields of structs) could
be derived for stronger protection. Variants of the policies that combine the notions of
static owner and depth could overcome the limitations of the Static Authorities and Depth
Isolation policies. Our policies do not differentiate between arguments, which would also
be a straightforward addition. Policies designed against a stronger threat model (e.g.,
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untrusted code) would also be an interesting extension to this work.
3.8.3. Conclusion
In this work we demonstrate how a general-purpose tagged architecture can accelerate stack
protection security policies expressed in the Software-Defined Metadata Processing model.
We propose a simple policy that only protects return addresses, as well as two richer policies
that provide object-level protection of all stack data. Our policies carry forward information
available to the compiler about the arrangement of stack memory and the intent of the
various accesses to the stack and validate them at runtime with metadata tags and rules.
Our policies exploit the locality properties of typical programs to achieve effective hardware
acceleration via a metadata tag rule cache. The main source of overhead incurred by the
policies is the instructions added to tag and clear stack memory. We explore optimizations
for reducing this overhead, bringing the overheads for our policies below 6% for memory
safety and 4% for data-flow integrity. Although we derive our policies in the SDMP model,
our designs and optimizations are likely applicable to other tagged architectures.
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CHAPTER 4 : Heap Protection Policies
4.1. Introduction
In this chapter, we turn to constructing micropolicies for protecting the heap, a source of
dynamic memory. In contrast to stack memory, which is implicitly allocated and deallocated
via function call and return, heap memory is managed explicitly by invoking a software
component called an allocator. The allocator obtains large blocks of memory from the
underlying OS (e.g., with sbrk), and in turn it services dynamic memory requests and
releases from the application from its pool of memory. Modern allocators (such as the
one provided in the GNU C library [124]) are sophisticated and highly-tuned to balance
performance and memory fragmentation, among other objectives.
Vulnerabilities related to heap memory and the management thereof can arise from several
bug classes. Simple spatial memory errors can also occur on the heap, i.e., heap overflows
are an analog to stack overflows as discussed in the previous chapter. Additionally, manual
memory management is notoriously error-prone and introduces several new bug classes
that are unique to the heap. In manually managed languages, programmers must strictly
obey implicit (and unenforced) allocation rules (do not access freed memory, do not pass
a pointer to free more than once, do not pass a pointer to free that did not originate from
the allocator, and so on [25]). A failure to uphold these rules on any program execution
is undefined behavior and can lead to exploitable vulnerabilities. Heap-based exploits have
become very popular among attacks against real systems [17], even overtaking other kinds
of memory errors in recent years [127]. Our goal in this section is to enumerate invariants
of the heap abstraction, construct micropolicies that can enforce them, and explore the




Dynamic memory in C/C++ provides programmers with a long-lived data store for con-
structing their applications; stack memory, in contrast, is automatically released when a
function returns to its caller. Dynamic memory is managed by a software component called
an allocator, which is typically included in the C Standard Library, such as glibc. In C,
programmers directly interact with the allocator through functions such as malloc and
free, which allocate new memory blocks of at least a specified size and release them back
to the allocator, respectively. In C++ it is more common to invoke new and delete to
manage object lifecycles. In either case, it is up to the programmer to allocate new objects
and release them when they are no longer needed. From the allocator’s perspective, a run-
ning program performs a series of allocation and deallocation requests, and the allocator’s
goal is to quickly return memory blocks of the desired size to the program while minimizing
fragmentation to reduce the overall memory requirements of that application.
To serve these memory requests, the allocator obtains large blocks of memory from the
underlying OS with the brk system call which extends the program’s data segment. From
this large region the allocator divides out smaller, variable-sized chunks of memory for the
program. Most modern allocators choose to use an in-band metadata design [135], where
the allocator’s metadata (such as the size of the block) is stored inside the allocated chunk
at the beginning before the memory that is intended for the program’s use; we will use the
terminology payload to refer to the portion of the chunk that is intended for the program’s
use, and control-data to refer to the allocator’s own metadata words inside each chunk.
We use control-data instead of the more standard metadata terminology to avoid conflation
with tags, which are also a form of metadata. To create room for the control-data, allocated
chunks are several words larger then the requested size of the payload.
When a program calls free on a pointer, its corresponding memory chunk can be reclaimed;
49
allocators will typically maintain lists of freed chunks, and a freshly freed chunk is placed
onto an appropriate free list. Future allocations can be satisfied with chunks from a free
list, effectively recycling memory such that new calls to brk can be avoided and the memory
footprint of the application does not grow. Most modern allocators will maintain a num-
ber of distinct free lists, usually demarcated by their size, allowing the allocator to more
quickly locate available memory blocks of a particular size from the available free lists; this
design strategy is known as binning [135]. When a chunk is freed, it may be merged with
neighboring free memory in a process known as coalescing.
The experiments in this section use the glibc allocator which is closely based on the
ptmalloc2 design. The layout of a chunk as depicted in malloc.c from glibc is shown
below:
chunk-> +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Size of previous chunk, if allocated | |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Size of chunk, in bytes |P|
mem-> +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| User data starts here... .
. .
. (malloc_usable_space() bytes) .
. |
nextchunk-> +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Size of chunk |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Figure 13: The layout of the malloc chunk structure from the glibc allocator.
Note that freed chunks are placed into a doubly-linked list, and the next and prev pointers
are placed following the chunk size when interpretted as a freed chunk.
4.2.2. Heap Vulnerabilities and Exploitation
Manual memory management is notoriously error-prone; programmers must follow a strict
set of implicit heap rules (Tab. 15). A violation to any one of these rules is undefined
behavior, and the exploitation of this undefined behavior has become a popular attack
vector of modern exploits [127]. Heap exploitation is the process of wielding a program
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Rule Bug Classification If Violated
Always check allocation result for NULL Null Dereference
Only free pointers that originated from allocator Invalid free
Do not access bytes outside of allocation’s payload Heap overflow / heap underflow
Do not use a freed pointer Use-after-free
Do not free the same memory more than once Double-free
Table 1: Rules for dynamic memory management in C and the resulting bug classes if
violated; rules shown are abridged, see the SEI CERT C Coding Standard [25].
bug (rule violation) to achieve an attacker’s goal, such as hijacking the control-flow of a
target process, manipulating its program data, or leaking other information. There are a
range of attack techniques that have been developed for targeting the various components
of the allocator’s attack surface. Many of the techniques depend on low-level features
of particular allocators (the memory layouts of chunks, bins and searching algorithms,
coalescing strategies, etc); as a result, writing heap exploits typically involves gaining a deep
understanding of a particular allocator’s internals, and exploits are typically customized to
the allocator the attacker assumes will be used by the victim program.
Heap overflows/underflows: Heap overflow and underflow bugs are bugs in which a
pointer to a heap-allocated object can be driven outside the bounds of the payload of that
allocated chunk, and then dereferenced for illegal reads or writes. It is common for programs
to keep many kinds of data on the heap, such as structs, arrays, and many of the program’s
internal data structures and state. With a heap overflow, an attacker can exploit the bug
to write to nearby data elements on the heap, corrupting any data that may be there [17].
Common targets for attackers include data and code pointers; code pointers are of particular
interest, in that they can be corrupted to hijack control-flow, e.g., [105]. Heap overflows and
underflows are considered violations to spatial memory safety, in that a pointer is driven
outside of the bounds of the object it targets and then dereferenced.
Use-after-frees and Double-frees: After a pointer has been passed to free, that pointer
and all other existing pointers to the same object are said to be dangling. Dereferencing
a dangling pointer is undefined behavior, and doing so is referred to as a use-after-free.
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Use-after-free bugs can be exploited by attackers to achieve a range of memory corruption
goals: for example, if a new object has been allocated in the same memory that has been
freed (i.e., the block was placed onto a free-list and then subsequently used to satisfy an
allocation), then accesses from the dangling pointer can be used to perform violating reads
or writes to the new object.
Additionally, it is undefined behavior to call free on the same object more than once, and
doing so is called a double-free. Double-free bugs can also be exploited by attackers to
achieve memory corruption: for example, after the first free, the allocator will place the
memory chunk onto a free list and may use it to serve future allocations. If the dangling
pointer is freed a second time after the chunk has been recycled for a different allocation, it
will inadvertently free the new object’s chunk, thus leading to future use-after-frees. Use-
after-free and double-free bugs are both examples of temporal memory safety violations, in
that pointers are used after their targeted objects have logically expired.
Control-Data Corruption: A common set of techniques for achieving reliable exploita-
tion of heap vulnerabilities involve control-data corruption or manipulation. These tech-
niques take advantage of the allocator’s in-band metadata design, where the allocator’s
own control-data is stored adjacent to the user data and is exposed for corruption without
protection or sanitization. The goal of these attacks is to trick the allocator into perform-
ing illegal or invalid heap management operations of the attacker’s control by poisoning the
allocator’s control-data; this corruption can be achieved through any of the above types
of heap memory errors. The first known attack of this category is a famous exploit by
Solar Designer [39] that uses a heap overflow to manipulate the next and previous chunk
pointers in a freed chunk; the unlink macro that operates on the linked list data structure
of freed chunks can be tricked into nearly arbitrary writes, which he uses to corrupt a code
pointer to compromise the Netscape web browser from a JPEG rendering component. In
the following years, new techniques for heap exploitation of this variety were developed and
refined [9, 85, 67] and continued to defeat hardening efforts of allocators [99, 20, 21].
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More recently, Tavis Ormandy of Google Project Zero showed that a single NULL byte over-
flow into glibc’s control-data was sufficient to compromise the Chrome web browser [95],
and new techniques for heap exploitation continue to be discovered [135]. Lastly, note real
heap exploits on complex software are typically complex, multistage engineering efforts that
combine together multiple bugs or use a single bug to trigger additional vulnerabilities; for
example, a recent in-the-wild exploit against iOS was reverse engineered and was discovered
to first trigger a heap overflow that caused a second, synthetic use-after-free error that was
significantly more reliable and controllable than the initial vulnerability [17], a technique
known as vulnerability conversion.
Heap Grooming: Unlike stack memory, where there is a high degree of spatial and tem-
poral predictability of the memory layout both within a stack frame and in the broader
calling context (effectively fixed at compile time), heap memory is dynamic: the spatial
and temporal relationships of chunks to one another depend on the (likely data-dependent)
sequence of allocation and deallocation events performed by the program, as well as the
specific binning, searching and coelescing choices taken by the allocator. In order to reli-
ably control heap vulnerabilities, exploit developers have engineered a range of techniques
for achieving predictable (or at least probabilistically likely) chunk arrangements by driving
the allocator through a particular sequence of heap operations, i.e., consuming all avail-
able freed chunks to trigger a fresh brk call (and thus predictable spatial arrangements of
subsequent allocations that are carved from a single contiguous fresh data block), or free
ing a placeholder object of a particular size to cause a victim object to be allocated in its
place, and so on. This category of technique includes heap spraying, heap grooming, and
heap manipulation [120]. Additionally, it is even possible to fingerprint an allocator version
to determine the exact build, data offsets, and functional behavior required for this kind of
exploitation [67].
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4.3. Threat Model and Assumptions
In developing our micropolicies to protect the heap, we take on a powerful and realistic
threat model for systems software. A program written in C or C++ is linked with the
glibc allocator (the current default on most Linux systems) with its in-band metadata de-
sign. The program may contain vulnerabilities related to the heap, including heap overflow
or underflow vulnerabilities, as well as use-after-free or double-free vulnerabilities. Attack-
ers may wield these vulnerabilities by manipulating the program data under their control
to trigger bugs and use them to corrupt either heap-allocated program data or allocator
control-data. For example, if there is a scanf call without a bounds check, an attacker may
supply a large string and use it to corrupt allocator control-data or heap-allocated data ob-
jects (Fig. 14). We assume the allocator implementation may be modified to communicate
information about its operations to the tagging system.
1 // Vulnerable code: auth overwrite
2 struct secret { int auth; };
3 int main(){
4 char ∗ name = malloc(32);




9 printf("User %s has auth %d.\n",
10 name, my secret −> auth);
11 }
Figure 14: An example heap overflow error that exposes auth to memory corruption from
scanf (left) and the heap protection micropolicy halting an invalid access (right).
4.4. Policy Formulation and Implementation
Our core policy design for heap protection micropolicies is based on the dynamic tainting and
checking technique introduced in [30], which we translate to an SDMP policy and extend
in several ways. The scheme works as follows: when an allocation occurs, the allocated
block is painted with a color c. When a pointer is created that targets that allocation, the
pointer itself is marked with the same color. When a pointer is dereferenced, the color of
the pointer and the color of the memory word are compared; if the colors are not the same,
54
then the access is determined to be illegal and it can be halted by the policy. In Fig. 14,
the name allocation is colored blue and the my secret allocation is colored yellow; when the
the scanf overflow occurs, the program can be halted when a blue pointer would write to
a yellow object.
Color tags on pointers propagate as they move between registers as well as to and from
memory. Because a colored pointer can be stored in a colored memory region, colors on
memory words contain two separate colors: the cell color (the color of the memory location
itself) and the pointer color (the color on the value stored in that location). The variety
of policies we consider in this section differ only in their coloring schemes, i.e., how we
choose c for each allocation. Unlike the stack policies, which require code instrumentation
in addition to tagging, the heap policies are much less intrusive; previous work [30] has
shown this taint-tracking scheme to be compatible with x86 and MIPS binaries. In the rest
of this section we show how this coloring scheme can be translated into a tag policy for the
SDMP used to detect and eliminate invalid heap memory accesses.
4.4.1. Tag Structure
Tags on memory locations are pairs (CellColor, PointerColor), where each color is an
integer value indicating the corresponding taint identifier. Intuitively, the CellColor can
be thought of as a tag on the memory location (which allocation the word belongs to),
while the PointerColor is a tag on the data stored there (either the color of the heap
pointer, or ⊥ if the word does not hold a heap pointer). Additionally, tags have two other
bits to indicate the presence of two special values: the Free special value indicates that
the cell holds unallocated heap memory, and the Allocator special value is used to mark
the allocator’s control-data to protect it from the program. If either of these two special
tag bits is set, then the color values are ignored by the policy. If neither bit is set and the
CellColor value is 0, then the memory is interpretted as non-heap memory. To reduce
the number of tags and rules required by the policy, Free and Allocator tags are always
supplied in a canonical form where the CellColor and PointerColor tags are 0.
55
Tags on registers contain a single field representing a numeric value, PointerColor. If
the value is 0, then the tag is interpretted as ⊥, indicating that it is not a heap pointer.
Otherwise, the value of PointerColor is interpretted as the taint identifier for that pointer.
4.4.2. Tagging Allocated and Freed Memory
The heap policies are built on a foundation of labeling both memory cells and pointer values
with taint marks (colors) such that their operations can be checked. Heap memory that
has not yet been allocated is marked with the special Free tag bit, which indicates that
the memory is unallocated heap memory. This tag is placed on all words in new memory
blocks that are acquired by the allocator, either through sbrk or mmap.
The program invokes the allocator by calling one of its interface functions, which in glibc
includes malloc, calloc, realloc, valloc and pvalloc. When such a function is called,
the allocator partitions out a new chunk, then chooses a CellColor value and applies it to
each program-usable word in the allocated chunk’s payload. These setup instructions are
the only instructions in the program permitted to claim Free memory, which they convert
to allocated memory and label with the appropriate CellColor tag. Next, the allocator
tags the control-data values inside that chunk with the Allocator tag. Both kinds of chunk
setup instructions require all words to be previously-marked as Free, otherwise the allocator
produces a policy violation.
After allocation is complete, the allocator tags the resulting pointer with a PointerColor
matching the CellColor chosen by the allocator. The rules used to govern the propagation
of pointer tags are discussed in the following subsection.
When the program has finished using an allocated block, it releases it by calling free
with an appropriate pointer. The allocator inspects the tag on the incoming pointer; if
that pointer is ⊥, then an invalid free error is detected and the policy raises a violation.
Otherwise, the allocator tags each freed word with the canonical Free tag. All such freed
words must contain a CellColor that matches the color on PointerColor that was freed,
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otherwise a policy violation is raised.
The most complex function to manage for proper tagging of heap memory was realloc.
The realloc function takes as input a pointer p and a size s. If the new size s is larger
than the existing allocated chunk, then the chunk may grow; depending on the state of
the allocator, the chunk may grow in-place or move (including copying bytes from the old
location to the new one). If the new size s is smaller than the allocated chunk, then the
allocated chunk may shrink. If the incoming pointer p is NULL, then the C standard
dictates that the realloc be treated as a fresh malloc. If the new size s is 0, then the
realloc is to be treated as a free. As such, realloc is a complete interface to the allocator
and we treat each such case seperately.
If the allocator exhausts its supply of free memory, then the allocation fails and it returns
a NULL pointer to the program. On this code path and this code path only, the resulting
pointer is tagged with a special INVALID-PTR tag, thus granting the program no access to
heap memory. Returning an INVALID-PTR in is not considered a policy violation, but a
future dereference of that pointer by the program is a violation. This policy design means
that a tag violation is thrown only if a program fails to properly handle its out-of-memory
error cases.
4.4.3. Propagating Pointer Tags
The allocator sets the PointerColor tag on pointers returned to the program, giving it
access rights to the freshly allocated block by dereferencing that pointer. The pointer
may subsequently be moved between registers or stored-to and loaded-from memory as the
program continues to perform its operations. To handle these cases, we apply analogous
rules to [30] that transfer the tag along with the data word to which it is associated, such
that the PointerColor is maintained on pointers to the allocated block.
For example, consider the case where a pointer of color cptr is stored into a heap region
of color ccell. To perform this access, the program must have a pointer of color ccell thus
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granting it access to the memory word. If the value stored there is colored cptr, then after
the store, the tag on that word will be (cmem, cptr). This tag means that the word is in an
allocation of color cmem but holds a pointer to an allocation of color cptr.
Subsequently, if the program uses a pointer of color cmem it can perform a legal load to that
word. If it does, the resulting register value would be tagged with cptr, thus providing the
program with an appropriately tagged pointer value for accessing those allocations. In this
way, the color tags on pointers are maintained as the program stores and retrieves them
from memory.
Note that a pointer may undergo mathematical operations (e.g., pointer arithmetic) as well
as mov operations between registers, in which case the pointer color is similarly preserved.
Other types of instructions such as xor remove the pointer color from the result tag. We
discuss practical issues that were encountered related to the propagation of pointer tags in
Sec. 4.7.
4.4.4. Policy Variations
The policy variations we present in this section are constructed by varying the ways in
which new colors are assigned by the allocator to fresh allocations. We include a simple
policy that provides only coarse-grained protection using a small number of tags and rules;
other policies variations use more colors for stronger protection. In Sec. 4.5 we evaluate the
policies on their number of used tags, rules and dynamic rule cache hit rate. In Sec. 4.6
we characterize them in terms of the types of errors and violations they are able to protect
against.
One-Color: The One-Color policy uses a single color c for all allocations. It is designed
as a lightweight policy that uses a modest number of tags to separate memory words into
several classes (allocated heap memory, freed heap memory and non-heap memory) and
pointers into two classes (heap pointers and all other values).
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N-Color: Rather than assigning a single color to all allocations, the N-Color policy cycles
through a pool of N such total colors. This approach is taken by other existing tagging
architectures such as SPARC CPUs with ADI [94] which can supply a modest number (8 or
16) of differentiable tags. This allows for more reliable detection and prevention of memory
errors at the cost of increased tags and rules, but still limits the total number of identifiers
to reduce the rule cache pressure.
Infinite-Color: At the limit, we assign a unique color to each fresh allocation without
any tag reuse at all. The Infinite-Color policy generates the most tags and rules, but also
provides the strongest security guarantee: complete spatial and temporal memory safety
for heap allocations.
Note that an integer CellColor of any fixed bit width will eventually exhaust its supply
of unique identifiers. This issue is a practical concern for 32-bit integers or smaller, but
not likely a concern for 64-bit integers or larger on the time scale of human lives and
typical program executions. More importantly, recent work has shown that a program can
asynchronously scan its memory and reclaim freed identifiers at a modest cost [76]; in the
limit, such an approach would drive the number of required unique identifiers to only match
the number of live, extant allocations by a program, a much more manageable task. This
approach would allow a policy to achieve the same security properties of the infinite case
without excessive tag sizes. Indeed, any real memory system has a finite number of words
of memory, which means the number of live tags has a finite bound.
Allocation-Site: Lastly, we consider a final policy variation that takes a slightly different
approach from the other variations. Rather than cycling through a pool of colors that
is shared by the entire program like the N-Color policy, the Allocation-Site policy cycles
through a pool of colors per allocation-site in the program. At a color limit of 1, then there
would be a unique color per allocation site, but the objects allocated from each of those
sites would be undifferentiable from each other. At higher color limits, additional colors per
allocation-site are dispensed to separate objects from those sites. This policy variation also
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reduces the number of tags and rules compared to the Infinite-Color case, but provides the
additional guarantee that there will be no color reuse between data types or allocator calls
from different program points, a useful security improvement we discuss further in Sec. 4.6.
4.5. Evaluation
Evaluation Framework: We evaluate our heap protection micropolicies using the same
basic methodology and architectural parameters as the stack chapter (Chapter 3 Sec. 3.4.1).
A custom PUMP simulator is used to simulate metadata tags and policy evaluation logic.
We run our experiments on the SPEC CPU2006 benchmarks; each benchmark is run until
it finishes its initial setup logic, then it runs for 1 billion warmup instructions followed by
a measurement period of 500 million instructions. In this chapter, we exclude the Fortran
benchmarks which do not use dynamic memory1 and perform evaluation only on the C/C++
benchmarks.
Tags, Rules and Colors: The PUMP accelerates security policies by caching metadata
rules, and so the diversity and locality of those rules is the major driving force of policy
overhead. As a result, one of the first questions to investigate is the relationship between the
number of unique identifiers that are assigned to heap allocations and the resulting number
of tags and rules that are generated by the policy logic. In Fig. 15 we show the average
number of unique rules processed by the PUMP per million instructions as a function of the
number of colors used in the N-color policy. If the number of rules per million instructions
is smaller than the rule cache size (1024), then the cost of enforcement will be low. When
more rules than can fit in the cache are required by the policy, there will be more runtime
costs for policy enforcement. At the limit, if the number of rules is so high that the rule
cache is thrashed, policy costs can become very high.
The One-Color policy (a maximum colors of 1) uses only ten unique tags and an average of
1Dynamic memory was introduced in Fortran 90, but these workloads largely predate those language
changes and/or do not use the ALLOCATE command. The Fortran benchmarks still use the libc runtime


































































































Figure 15: The number of unique rules processed by the PUMP per million instructions
during each benchmark’s measurement period as a function of the number of colors used to
differentiate allocations.
only twenty-two total rules, making it a very lightweight policy that can quite comfortably
fit in the rule cache. As more colors are used to differentiate allocations, the total number
of tags and rules begins to increase. Most benchmarks see only a modest increase in rules
as more colors are used; these are benchmarks that perform only moderate rates of dynamic
memory allocations, which means assigning them fresh allocations does not impose much
rule pressure. The total number of rules required per million instructions is typically less
than one thousand, and many of them require less than a thousand total during their entire
measurement period. This means that at the infinite color limit these policies still have
manageable rule cache behavior.
In contrast, we also see several benchmarks—dealII, gcc, perlbench and omnetpp—that
perform rapid memory allocations and generate frequent color pairs throughout their exe-
cutions. These workloads generate significant numbers of tags and rules, and at high color
limits can require thousands to tens of thousands of rules per million instructions. The
worst offending benchmark, omnetpp, is a network traffic simulator that simulates packets
and routers containing packet buffers, each of which are heap-allocated objects. Pointers to
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packets are frequently stored into packet buffers, generating many combinations of colors.
In fact, at a maximum colors of 128, omnetpp generates nearly the full 128 × 128 product
of all color combinations over its full measurement period. Additionally, omnetpp simulates
network traffic in small timesteps and updates the entire graph each timestep, producing
very little rule locality, a near worst-case scenario for the PUMP and its heap policy.
Overheads and Colors:
Next, we investigate how the number of colors impacts the dynamic rule cache hit rate and
thus final runtime overhead of the heap policy variations. In Fig. 16 we show the runtime
overhead as a function of the number of unique colors in the N-Color policy, including
both the One-Color and Infinite-Color cases. The One-Color policy imposes only a 1%
overhead due to the small number of rules required to represent the policy. Even at the
Infinite-Color limit, fifteen out of nineteen policies have overheads less than 10%; the four
benchmarks with high dynamic rule counts see higher overheads, with omnetpp imposing
more than 400% overhead. This shows that while most workloads with modest dynamic-
memory usage produce rule patterns that can be cached favorably, some workloads challenge
the rule cache and require frequent dynamic rule resolutions.
Lastly, in Fig. 17 we show the overheads results for the Allocation-Site policy which dis-
penses pools of colors per allocation site. Note that in this plot, the number of colors
indicates the number of colors per allocation site. With only a single color per allocation
site, the policy imposes only a 1.2% overhead. The results for this policy trend similarly to
the N-Color policy but have favorable security properties, which we explore in the Sec. 4.6.
Case study: Omnetpp The omnetpp benchmark was the most challenging workload for
the PUMP to cache due to the rapid rate of heap allocations and the frequent generation
of color pairs. Rather than limiting the total number of colors across all objects in the
system, an alternative approach to reducing overhead costs is to focus specifically on the
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Figure 16: The overhead imposed by the N-color heap micropolicy as a function of the
maximum number of unique color identifiers. In this policy, the colors are drawn from a
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Figure 17: The overhead imposed by the Allocation-Site heap micropolicy. In this policy,
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(a) The impact of selectively relaxing the allo-
cation sites most responsible for rule generation
in omnetpp. Relaxing only two allocation sites
is sufficient to reduce the overhead from over














(b) The impact of increasing the color pool sizes
for the two allocation sites most responsible for
tag and rule diversity. Small pool sizes lead to
only marginal increases in enforcement costs.
Figure 18: A case study on relaxing the heap policy on omnetpp, the worst-performing
benchmark.
this, we add additional tracking into our framework to attribute each tag and rule that is
generated back to the allocation site from which it originated. This allows us to calculate
the allocation-sites that are responsible for most of the tag and rule diversity; from this
data, we can run a hybrid policy in which only a select few allocation sites are treated with
the Allocation-Site policy while maintaining the Infinite Color policy for all the rest of the
object types in the system.
We conduct two experiments. First, we identify which allocation sites must be relaxed to
remove the majority of the rule diversity. For this experiment, we consider relaxing up to
the five allocation sites most responsible for the most rules to a single color per allocation
site. We show these results in Fig. 18a. As can be seen, by relaxing just two of the allocation
sites in this way, the overhead drops from over 400% to less than 20%. The two allocation
sites responsible for the high costs in the policy were those for constructing and duplicating
packet objects. Second, we show the impact of increasing the pool size per allocation site
for these two allocation sites. These results are shown in Fig. 18b. More colors can be used




Next, we consider the protection offered by the various policy designs. A mitigation is
useful when it is able to disarm bug classes by rendering them non-exploitable, typically
by providing fail-stop behavior i.e., halting the machine before it would perform dangerous
undefined behavior. In this section we consider a range of bug classes inspired by the safe
dynamic memory management rules from Tab. 15 and discuss the protection offered by each
of the various policy variations.
Null Dereference (1):
1 // Bug class 1: Null Dereference
2 int main(){
3 char ∗ p = malloc(LARGE SIZE);
4 sprintf(p, "Test");
5 }
In this bug class, a program fails to check an allocator invocation’s result for NULL, then
proceeds to access memory with the resulting pointer. On some platforms Null Dereference
bugs may only lead to system crashes / denial of service attacks, while on other platforms
including Windows 7 and prior (as well as compatibility modes for older software on modern
Windows systems) they can be exploited for devastating memory corruption [108]. The Null
Dereference bug class is prevented from exploitability by the One-Color policy as well as all
subsequent policies; when the allocator returns a NULL pointer, it has the INVALID-PTR
tag, which produces a tag violation if the program attempts to dereference it.
Invalid Free (2):
1 // Bug class 2: Invalid Free
2 int main(int argc, char ∗∗ argv){
3 char ∗ message = malloc(32);
4 snprintf(message, 32, "%s", argv[1]);
5 ...
6 if (error){





In the invalid free bug class, a program calls free on a pointer that did not originate from
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the allocator. If an attacker controls the data the pointer points to (not shown), it can
be used to forge synthetic allocator control-data to hijack the allocator’s behavior, leading
to further memory errors and system compromise. This bug class is also prevented by the
One-Color policy and all subsequent policies: legal heap pointers are differentiated from
all other pointers by their PointerColor tag, and when free is passed a pointer with the
⊥ tag, the PUMP halts program execution. Additionally, valid allocator control-data has
the Allocator tag, and any forged control-data would not, which would also produce a tag
violation when the allocator accesses those words.
Contiguous Heap Overflow (3):
1 // Bug class 3: Contiguous Heap Overflow
2 struct secret { int auth; };
3 int main(){
4 char ∗ name = malloc(32);




9 printf("User %s has auth %d.\n",
10 name, my secret −> auth);
11 }
In this common and high-severity bug class, a program contains a contiguous memory
error in a heap object. A contiguous error is one in which the bug permits only contiguous
accesses from an existing buffer, such as this unsafe call to scanf. Contiguous errors are less
powerful exploit primitives that non-contiguous (arbitrary) errors in which an attacker may
also control the offset of the overflow to perform more sophisticated memory manipulation.
Contiguous errors may be used to exploit either other heap-allocated objects or allocator
control-data: in this case the auth field may be overwritten.
This bug class is prevented by the One-Color policy as well as all subsequent policies; the
allocated payload of each chunk contains an Allocator tag on either side, which prevents
contiguous errors from writing beyond their payloads.
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Access Free Memory (4):
1 // Bug class 4: Access Free Memory
2 int main(int argc, char ∗∗ argv){
3 char ∗ p = malloc(32);
4 free(p);
5 sprintf(p, "%s", argv[1]);
6 }
In this bug class, a program reads or writes to memory that is currently free, either via a
dangling pointer or double-free. Free memory should never be accessed by a program: for
example, while free, a chunk’s contents are interpretted as additional allocator control-data
which can be written to poison the allocator’s behavior the next time it processes that freed
chunk.
The integrity of free memory is protected by the One-Color policy and all subsequent
policies: free memory is tagged with the special Free tag and program code is always
forbidden to access it.
Noncontiguous Heap Overflow To Different Object (5):
1 // Bug class 5: Noncontiguous Heap Overflow To Different Object
2 struct secret { int auth; };
3 void init (struct secret ∗ s) { s −> auth = 42; }
4 int main(int argc, char ∗∗ argv){
5 char ∗ first name = argv[1];
6 char ∗ last name = argv[2];
7 char ∗ full name = malloc(32 + 1);
8 struct secret ∗ my secret =
9 malloc(sizeof(struct secret));
10 init(my secret);
11 snprintf(full name, 16, "%s", first name);
12 snprintf(full name + strlen(first name), 16, " %s", last name);
13 printf("User %s has auth %d.\n",
14 full name, my secret −> auth);
15 }
In this bug class, the program provides the attacker with a powerful non-contiguous memory
error on a heap object; we add the additional constraint that exploitation requires corrupting
a different object (allocation site). This may occur either because the source object itself
does not provide useful footing for an attacker (such as a simple string), or because only
one object from that allocation site is live at the time that the bug may be triggered. In
this example, a maximum of 16 bytes from each of first name and last name plus a space
character are copied into full name, which is 33 bytes. However, on line 12 the length of
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first name is not verified, which allows that snprintf call to become out-of-bounds when
a name longer than 16 bytes is provided. As a result, this program allows the corruption of
the auth field of the secret variable from the program’s arguments without writing to the
intermediate Allocator tag like a contiguous error would. This bug class typically results
from indexing errors or buffer sizing errors on heap-allocated arrays.
This bug is prevented when the color of full name is not the same as other objects that an
attacker may want to target, such as my secret. The One-Color policy never satisfies this
requirement, and so it fails to prevent this bug class. The N-Color policy partially prevents
this bug class: whether or not another object that matches the color of full name is on the
heap depends on both the program and the number of colors. The allocation-site policy
always prevents this bug class, as the color of full name is guaranteed to match no other
heap objects, rendering the bug disarmed. This benefit shows us the advantage of binding
colors to allocation sites instead of recycling through a global pool.
Use-After-Free to Corrupt Different Object (6):
1 // Bug class 6: Use−After−Free to Corrupt Different Object
2 struct secret { int auth; char ∗ message};




7 // Allocate and free an object
8 struct linked list ∗ l = malloc(sizeof(struct linked list);
9 free(l);
10
11 // Receive same chunk from allocator
12 struct secret ∗ my secret = malloc(sizeof(struct secret));
13
14 // Use−after−free from l to corrupt secret −> auth
15 l −> val = 1;
16
17 }
In this bug class, a dangling pointer from one object type (allocation-site) is used to access
the memory of a different type of object. In the example shown above, a dangling pointer
to a linked list object is used to corrupt a secret object. The One-Color policy does not
prevent this bug class, as all objects are marked with the same color. The N-Color policy
partially protects against this bug class, depending on the number of colors and the capa-
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bility of an attacker to groom heap operations. The Allocation-Site policy always protects
against this bug class by never reusing colors between allocation sites, which guarantees
that a dangling pointer can never access another type of object. Like bug class 5, this
shows the advantage of not reusing colors between allocation sites.
Arbitrary Spatial or Temporal Error (7): Lastly, we consider an arbitrary spatial or
temporal error. This time we make no assumptions about the allocation-sites or error type.
Arbitrary logic may take place between allocator events, and the attacker may influence the
program’s behavior to achieve arbitrary heap grooming operations. The only policy that
can protect against this powerful bug class is the Infinite-Color policy, which never allocates
a color that is currently in use by any pointer or memory chunk.
Summary: The heap policy variations and the bug classes they defend against are sum-
marized in Fig. 19. We find that the One-Color policy is sufficient to defend against four of
these threats (including the common and high severity contiguous heap overflow) with only
a handful of tags and rules. The Allocation-Site policy with a single color per site is similarly
modest at 1% overhead but additionally defeats cross-object type corruptions compared to
just the One-Color policy. The N-Color policy is effective at detecting bugs, but with both
high costs associated with larger number of colors and the possibility of a powerful adversary
(1) using grooming techniques to match colors even on an invalid access or (2) repeatedly
attempting exploitation to brute force a successful intrusion, the policy provides limited
additional security comparatively against a strong threat model. As a result, it is wiser to
allocate pools of colors per allocation site to spend additional tag diversity for hardening
systems, or simply using the Infinite-Color policy. The Infinite-Color policy has a small
overhead (<10%) for fifteen of the nineteen applications with lower dynamic memory usage
and provides the strongest guarantees; for many workloads, this policy is clearly the best
choice. For workloads that perform poorly with the Infinite-Color policy, one can either
relax just a couple allocation site that are most responsible for rule generation, or one can






y One-Color X X X 1.01%
N-Color — — X 1.01% - 37%
Allocation-Site X 1.2% - 37%
Infinite Color 37%
Prevent Null Dereference (1)
Prevent Invalid Free (2)
Prevent Contiguous Heap Overflow (3)
Prevent Access to Free Memory (4)
Prevent Noncontiguous Heap Overflow To Different Object (5)
Prevent Use-After-Free on Different Object (6)
Prevent All Spatial and Temporal Violations (7)
Overhead
Figure 19: Security characterization of heap policy variations
4.7. Policy Compatibility
The heap protection policies introduced in this section are built on a scheme of tracking
taint colors on both pointers and memory locations. While this scheme is compatible with
most software ([30] argue for binary compatibility on x86 and MIPS), the expressive power
provided in C/C++ to manipulate the bits and bytes of pointers or inline raw assembly code
means that there is no guarantee that all existing functional behavior will pass the heap
protection micropolicies’ taint checks. In this section we explore some of the compatibility
issues and porting efforts that were necessary to run the SPEC benchmarks with the heap
micropolicies. Sixteen out of nineteen benchmarks did not require any manual porting,
whereas three benchmarks did: gcc, perlbench and soplex.
Pointer Color Propagation: The most common issue encountered while constructing,
refining, and porting the heap micropolicy to the SPEC benchmarks was determining the
pointer-propagation rules for the various types of machine instructions. The vast majority
of instruction types can be unambiguously assigned to the always-propagate (e.g., mov) or
the never-propagate (e.g., shr) classes as one might expect. However, for some operation
types, the classification is not so simple.
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To illustrate this issue, consider this code snippet from gcc in ggc-page.c:
Figure 20: Pointer tag propagation ambiguity for the and opcode in the gcc benchmark.
In this example, G.pagesize is known to be a power of two. On line 1, -G.pagesize
is calculated, which will contain 1 values in the most-significant bits and 0 values in the
least-significant bits, thus making it a bitmask for and that preserves the high bits and only
zeroes-out the low bits of the operand. This and instruction with such a bitmask should
propagate the pointer color of allocation to the page variable, as it will be dereferenced
by the program as a pointer to the same chunk.
However, on line 3, G.pagesize -1 is calculated, which produces a result with 0 values in
the most-significant bits and 1 values in the least-significant bits. This time, the bitmask
for and zeroes-out the high bits and keeps only the low bits, with an integer result that
should not constitute a pointer. In other words, the correct propagation rule for and is
data-dependent on the value of the operand (bitmask).
It should be noted that in all such examples we encountered, the proper propagation policy
could be determined by the expected type of the result: page is a pointer and tail slop an
integer, which means a tag-aware compiler could supply the required differentiation. As a
result, we find that the heap policies are quite compatible with most software, but may oc-
casionally require either (1) additional compiler assistance, or (2) some manual propagation
assignments to support programs that manipulate pointers in this way. Our framework
takes the later approach: gcc has ten such instructions that are manually tagged to be
pointer preserving and soplex has three, whereas all others receive a default classification
of not-preserving.
Sub-word Object Manipulation: Another type of issue that arises while doing memory
protection with tags is sub-word data manipulation. In the PUMP architecture, tags are
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associated with each word of data, i.e., a 4-byte pointer is associated with a 4-byte tag on
that pointer. Heap allocations are always aligned at the word boundary and their size is
always a multiple of the machine’s word size, which means that heap objects themselves
lend well to being tagged. However, in C it is fairly common for programmers to cast
data objects to the char * type and operate on them as bytes, which causes gcc to emit
machine instructions such as stb that operate on single bytes. To accommodate for cases
in which pointers themselves may be copied in sub-word increments, we loosen the color
propagation rules on pointers to include sub-word size transfers. A consequence of this
distinction is that it may be possible for a word to become tainted with a pointer color
while itself not constituting a full pointer. We believe this is generally acceptable in that
either (1) the full pointer value will be copied eventually, in which case the pointer will
point to the appropriate memory region with the correct pointer tag, or (2) a value with a
pointer tag will not point to the appropriate memory chunk, in which case any dereference
will be correctly determined to be invalid.
The most egregious code pattern of this variety was observed in the gcc benchmark in a
Quicksort implementation. The code casts all data elements to byte arrays, and then swaps
elements byte-by-byte as the algorithm dictates. In this case two pointers are swapped
in-place, as illustrated below:
Each time a pair of bytes is swapped, the colors of each pointer word also swap due to
the loosened propagation rules. After any even number of such swaps, the colors on the
pointers will end where they started. After four such swaps, the actual pointer values
will have traded places, but the pointer tags will end where they started, thus yielding an
incorrect state of the pointer tags. To resolve this issue, we supply a new sorting algorithm
that operates on full words at a time. This was the only change to source code required
to run the SPEC benchmarks, but does highlight the difficulties in supporting the range of
behavior found in C code.
Custom Allocators: Lastly, some applications choose to deploy their own memory allo-
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(b) A red pointer and a blue pointer are
swapped in-place a single byte a time by a sort-
ing algorithm. At timesteps t1 - t3, each word
contains a portion of each pointer.
Figure 21: Sub-word data manipulation in a Quicksort implementation.
cators, such as the gcc benchmark. To handle these cases for fine-grained protection, it
would be necessary to supply the proper tagging hooks on the memory events of the cus-
tom allocator. We do not hook gcc’s allocator in this way, which means the actual color
tracking is more coarse-grained than the program’s true allocations; it should be noted that
gcc uses the default allocator in many cases as well, so the color tracking is actually at a
mixed granularity. We note that many of gcc’s pointer compatibility issues discussed above
(Fig. 20) are related to the custom allocator implementation which requires the shown bit-
level data manipulation. Several of the benchmarks also use wrappers to allocators (such
as xmalloc), and so we treat those as primary allocation sites as well.
4.8. Limitations and Future Work
The heap micropolicies presented in this section are field insensitive, meaning that subob-
jects inside the same heap allocation are not differentiated. As a result, even the Infinite-
Color policy does not protect against a buffer overflow internal to a single heap allocation
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that holds a composite structure or object with multiple fields. With additional compiler
support, it would be possible to assign separate colors to subobjects for additional protec-
tion at the cost of more tags and rules. Investigating this cost would be interesting future
work.
Another bug class that was not addressed by the policies presented in this section are unini-
tialized data errors. With the application of the lazy tagging policy variation, allocations
could start at an uninitialized state and the tagging system could be used to track ini-
tializations with the first write by the program, much the same as the lazy tagging stack
strategy (Sec. 3.5.1). With this approach, it would be possible to detect and halt the access
to uninitialized data, which the current policy designs do not detect or protect against. In
the stack work we found that programs including the SPEC benchmarks did use uninitial-
ized stack data relatively commonly (such as initializing a subset of the fields of a struct
and then copying it), which is likely to be observed for heap-allocated objects as well. As
a result, typical C code may not pass this policy; the policy would, however, indicate to
programmers exactly where the uninitialized data accesses are occurring such that the code
could be further hardened from these kinds of bugs. Additionally, there are some bug classes
specific to the heap that are not best addressed with tags, such as memory leaks.
Another attack surface of allocators is their global data structures such as arena metadata
that can be corrupted; a final production heap policy would need to take care to protect
these objects as well. Lastly, another interesting direction for future work would be a formal
treatment of the policies’ security properties or the correctness of the policy rules.
4.9. Conclusion
The manual management of dynamic memory in C/C++ is notoriously error-prone and
heap-related memory errors have become the most popular attack vector for modern systems
exploits [17, 127]. Micropolicies on tagged architectures can be used to protect against a
range of common bug classes related to heap memory. We find that a simple One-Color
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policy is sufficient to defend against a useful range of heap-related errors with a very modest
number of unique tags and rules. The Allocation-Site policy is also quite lightweight and
protects against an additional bug class compared to the One-Color policy. Both of these
policies impose overheads of around 1%. The N-Color can be used to differentiate allocations
with increasing numbers of identifiers at higher costs. At the limit, the Infinite Color policy
provides complete spatial and temporal memory safety. While this policy can become
expensive for some workloads, we show how it can be relaxed in key ways to maintain more
protection. We find that the heap policies are quite compatible with most software and
required only a handful of manual refactorings to run on the SPEC benchmarks.
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CHAPTER 5 : Compartmentalization Policies
5.1. Introduction
Modern software stacks are notoriously vulnerable. Operating systems, device drivers,
and countless applications, including most embedded applications, are written in unsafe
languages and run in large, monolithic protection domains where any single vulnerability
may be sufficient to compromise an entire machine. Privilege separation is a defensive
approach in which a system is separated into components, and each is limited to (ideally)
just the privileges it requires to operate. In a such a separated system, a vulnerability in
one component (e.g., the networking stack) is isolated from other system components (e.g.,
sensitive process credentials), making the system substantially more robust to attackers, or
at least increasing the effort of exploitation in cases where it is still possible.
While the principle of least privilege [107] is a powerful guiding force in secure system
design, in practice it is often at odds with system performance. Given the limited hard-
ware resources that have been allocated for security, privilege separation has typically
relied on coarse-grained, process-level separation in which the virtual memory system is
used to provide isolation. For example, some security-critical and network-facing software
such as OpenSSH [19] and Dovecot [46] have been manually decomposed into multiple
intercommunicating-but-isolated processes to contain the effects of vulnerabilities, should
they be found.
While these select cases are a win for privilege reduction, the prevailing wisdom has been
that only coarse-grained privilege separation is feasible in practice given the high cost of
virtual memory context switching. Indeed, all modern OSs run on insecure but performant
monolithic kernels, with more functionality frequently moving into the highly-privileged
kernel to reduce such costs; privilege separated microkernels, in contrast, remain plagued
with the perception of high overheads and have seen little adoption. IoT and embedded
systems—which we now find ourselves surrounded by in our every-day lives—have fallen
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even farther behind in security than their general-purpose counterparts. They are also writ-
ten in memory unsafe languages, typically C, often lack basic modern exploit mitigations [3],
and many run directly on bare metal with no separation between any parts of the system
at all.
However, there has recently been a surge of interest—both academic and in industry—
in architectural and hardware support for new security primitives. For example, ARM
recently announced that it will integrate hardware capability support (CHERI [134]) into
its chip designs, Oracle has released SPARC processors with coarse-grained memory tagging
support (ADI [93]), and NXP has announced it will use Dover’s CoreGuard [110], among
many others [10]. One interesting and practical use case for these primitives is privilege
separation enforcement. In this chapter, we build privilege separation policies for a fine-
grained, hardware-accelerated security monitor design (the PIPE architecture [122, 43],
Chapter 2.1)).
A flexible, tag-based hardware security monitor, like the PIPE, provides an exciting oppor-
tunity to enforce fine-grained, hardware-accelerated privilege separation. At a bird’s-eye
view, one can imagine using metadata tags on code and data to encode logical protection
domains, with rules dictating which memory operations and control-flow transitions are per-
mitted. The PIPE leaves tag semantics to software interpretation, meaning one can express
policies ranging from coarse-grained decompositions, such as a simple separation between
“trusted” and “untrusted” components, to hundreds or thousands of isolated compartments
depending on the privilege reduction and performance characteristics that are desired.
To explore this space, we present SCALPEL (Secure Compartments Automatically Learned
and Protected by Execution using Lightweight metadata), a tool that enables the rapid
self-learning of low-level privileges and the automatic creation and implementation of com-
partmentalization security policies for a tagged architecture. At its back-end, SCALPEL
contains a policy compiler that decouples logical compartmentalization policies from their
underlying concrete enforcement with the PIPE architecture. The back-end takes as input
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a particular compartmentalization strategy, formulated in terms of C-level constructs and
their allowed privileges, and then automatically tags a program image to instantiate the
desired policy. To ease policy creation and exploration, the SCALPEL front-end provides a
tracing mode, compartment-generation algorithms, and analysis tools, to help an engineer
quickly create, compare and then instantiate strategies using the back-end. These tools
build on a range of similar recent efforts that treat privilege assessment quantitatively and
compartment generation algorithmically [31, 81, 98], allowing SCALPEL’s automation to
greatly assist in the construction of good policies, a task that would otherwise be costly
in engineering time. In cases where human expertise is available for additional fine-tuning,
SCALPEL easily integrates human supplied knowledge in its policy exploration; for exam-
ple, a human can add additional constraints to the algorithms, such as predefining a set
of boundaries, adjusting the weight on an object, or specifying that a particular object is
security-critical and should not be exposed to additional, unnecessary code.
Additionally, SCALPEL presents two novel techniques for optimizing security policies to a
tagged architecture. The first is a policy-construction algorithm that directly targets the
rule cache characteristics of an application: the technique is based on packing rules needed
for different program phases into sets that can be cached favorably. While we apply this
technique on SCALPEL’s compartmentalization policies, the core idea could be used to
improve the performance of other policies on tagged architectures. Additionally, we show
that this same technique can be used to pack an entire policy into a fixed-size set such that
no runtime rule cache misses will be taken—this makes it possible to achieve real-time guar-
antees while using a hardware security monitor like the PIPE, which may be of particular
value to embedded, real-time devices and applications. Secondly, we design and evaluate a
rule prefetching system that exploits the highly-predictable nature of compartmentalization
rules; by intelligently prefetching rules before they are needed, we show that the majority
of stalled cycles spent waiting for policy evaluation can be avoided.
We evaluate SCALPEL and its optimizations on a typical embedded, IoT environment con-
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sisting of a FreeRTOS stack targeting a PIPE-extended RISC-V core. We implement our
policies on several applications, including an HTTP web server, the bzip (de)compressor, an
H264 video encoder, the GNU Go engine, and the libXML parsing library. Using SCALPEL,
we show how to automatically derive compartmentalization strategies for off-the-shelf soft-
ware that balance privilege reduction with performance, and that hundreds of isolated
compartments can be simultaneously enforced with acceptable overheads on a tagged ar-
chitecture.
To summarize, SCALPEL combines (1) hardware support for fine-grained metadata tagging
and policy enforcement with (2) compartmentalization and privilege analysis tools, which
together allow a thorough exploration of the level of privilege separation that can be achieved
with hardware tagging support. Our primary contributions are:
• A tool that automatically creates and instantiates tag-based compartmentalization
policies on real software without manual refactorings.
• Compartment-generation algorithms and analysis tools that quantify the privilege
exposure and performance of a wide range of automatically-generated compartmen-
talization alternatives, providing the security engineer with a variety of privilege-
performance design points to explore and evaluate.
• New techniques for using a tagged architecture for the rapid self-learning of privileges
on unmodified software.
• A new technique for optimizing a security policy to a tagged architecture by directly
targeting its rule cache characteristics.
• A new rule prefetching technique for tagged architectures in which additional rules
are identified and prefetched on a cache miss.
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5.2. Background and Related Work
5.2.1. The PIPE Architecture
The PIPE (Processor Interlocks for Policy Enforcement) [122] is a software/hardware co-
designed processor extension for hardware-accelerated security monitor enforcement that is
a close relative of the PUMP (Chapter 2.1). Like the PUMP, the core idea is that word-sized
metadata tags are associated with data words in the system, including on register values,
words stored in memory, and also on the program counter. However, unlike the PUMP,
the PIPE uses a coprocessor design: the core application processor (referred to as the AP















Figure 22: The PIPE Architecture
The AP core can run ahead of rule resolution; a Write Queue holds unvalidated writes until
the write instruction and its predecessors can be validated by the rule cache.
5.2.2. The protection-performance tradeoff
While the PIPE can express memory safety policies [43, 106], fine-grained enforcement of all
memory accesses can become expensive for some workloads. Compartmentalization policies
represent an alternative design point that can very flexibly tune performance-protection
tradeoffs through changing compartment sizes and intelligently drawing boundaries for high-
performance. With a small number of tags, one can separate out trusted from untrusted
components such as ARM TrustZone [10] or OS from the application as in [118, 117],
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but ultimately we are interested in exploring finer-grained separations. For example, one
question we may pose is how tightly can we compartmentalize a software system with tag
support while maintaining a certain rule cache hit rate, say 99.9%.
Walking the line between protection and overhead costs is a well-known problem space.
Dong et al. [45] observed that different decomposition strategies for web browser compo-
nents produced wildly different overhead costs, which they manually balanced against do-
main code size or prior bug rates. Mutable Protection Domains [98] proposes dynamically
adjusting separation boundaries in response to overhead with a custom operating system
and manually engineered boundaries. Several recent works have proposed more quantitative
approaches to privilege separation. Program-Mandering [81] uses optimization techniques
to find good separation strategies that balance reducing sensitive information flows with
overhead costs, but requires manual identification of sensitive data, and ACES [31] simi-
larly measures the average reduction in write exposure to global variables as a property of
compartmentalizations. While these systems begin to automate portions of the compart-
ment formation problem that SCALPEL builds upon, they all still rely on manual input.
SCALPEL takes a policy derivation approach with a much stronger emphasis on automa-
tion: it uses analysis tools and performance experiments to explore the space of compart-
mentalizations, then automatically optimizes and lowers them to its hardware backend, a
tag-extended RISC-V architecture, for enforcement.
5.2.3. Automatic Privilege Separation
The vast majority of compartmentalization work to date has been manual, demanding a
security expert manually identify and refactor the code into separate compartments. This
includes the aforementioned projects like OpenSSH [19] and Dovecot [46], and even Mi-
croKernel design [77, 48, 104] using standard OS process isolation, and run-time protec-
tion for embedded systems with metadata tags [118, 117]. Academic compartmentaliza-
tion work has also relied on manual or semi-manual techniques for labeling and partition-
ing [19, 58, 62, 133].
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In contrast, one goal for SCALPEL is automation; that is, to apply tag-based privilege-
separation defenses to applications without expensive refactorings or manual-tagging; auto-
mated efforts relieve the labor-intensive costs of prior manual compartmentalization frame-
works. Additionally, automation is important to ease the task of protecting existing software
with the PIPE—SCALPEL decouples policy creation from enforcement by automatically
lowering an engineer’s C-level compartmentalization strategies to the instruction-level en-
forcement provided by the PIPE.
ACES [31] is an automated compartmentalization tool for embedded systems and shares
similarities with SCALPEL. It begins with a program dependence graph (PDG) represen-
tation of an application and a security policy (such as Filename, or one of several other
choices), which indicates a potential set of security boundaries. It then lowers the enforce-
ment of the policy to a target microcontroller device to meet performance and hardware
constraints. The microcontroller it targets supports configurable permissions for eight re-
gions of physical memory using a lightweight Memory Protection Unit (MPU); protection
domains in the desired policy are merged together until they can be enforced with these eight
regions. Unlike ACES, SCALPEL targets a tagged architecture to explore many possible
policies, some of which involve hundreds of protection domains, for fine-grained separation,
far beyond what can be achieved with the handful of segments supported by conventional
MPUs [79].
Towards Automatic Compartmentalization of C Programs on Capability Machines [126]
is also similar to SCALPEL. In this work, the compiler translates each compilation unit
of an application into a protection domain for enforcement with the CHERI capability
machine [134]. This allows finer-grained separation than can be afforded with a handful of
memory segments, but provides no flexibility in policy exploration to tune performance and
security characteristics like SCALPEL does.
To summarize, SCALPEL is a complete tool for automatically compartmentalizing unmod-
ified software for hardware acceleration, including automatically self-learning the required
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privileges, systematically exposing the range privilege-performance design-points through al-
gorithmic exploration, and optimizing policies for good rule cache performance. It comple-
ments and extends prior work along four axes: (1) quantitatively scoring the overprivilege
in compartmentalization strategies, (2) providing complete automatic generation of com-
partments without manual input, (3) offering decomposition into much larger numbers
of compartments (hundreds), and (4) automatically identifying the privilege-performance
tradeoff curves for a wide-range of compartmentalization options.
5.3. Threat Model
We assume a standard [31, 100] but powerful threat model for conventional C-based sys-
tems, in which an attacker may exploit bugs in either FreeRTOS or the application to gain
read/write primitives on the system, which they may use to hijack control-flow, corrupt
data, or leak sensitive information. Attackers supply inputs to the system, which, depend-
ing on the application, may include through a network connection or through files to be
parsed or encoded. We assume both FreeRTOS and the application are compiled statically
into a single program image with no separation before our compartmentalization; as such, a
vulnerability in any component of the system may lead to full compromise. We assume that
the test cases for the tracing mode are trusted, i.e., an attacker may not supply malicious
tests.
The protection supplied by SCALPEL isolates memory read and write instructions to the
limited subset of objects dictated by the policy, and also limits program control-flow opera-
tions to valid entry points within domains as dictated by the policy. Additionally, SCALPEL
is composed with a write-xor-execute [8] tag memory permissions policy that guarantees
that instructions (executable code) are not writeable, and any writeable value is not exe-
cutable. This means attackers cannot inject new executable code into the system. These
constraints prevent bugs from reaching the full system state and limit the impacts of attacks
to their contained compartments.
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5.4. Privilege Reduction and Compartmentalization
The goal of privilege separation is to reduce the severity of bugs. To illustrate these benefits
in practice, consider the Chrome web browser, perhaps the most well-studied and battle-
tested example of modern sandboxing. Since its inception, Chrome has used a broker
process model, in which the core browser process spawns subprocesses for various tasks and
interposes on their communication via IPC channels [14, 57]. Because the renderer contains
a substantial amount of historically error-prone code (including a multitude of parsers and
decoders for various file formats that are continually exposed to malicious inputs), it was
the first subcomponent to be sandboxed. Each site thus runs its own renderer process,
which means vulnerabilities inside the renderer are contained to their site-specific process
in the case of compromise. To see the impact this design has had on practical exploitation
against Chrome, one needs only to analyze modern exploit chains: in a recent writeup by
Google Project Zero [22], CVE-2019-5782, a memory error inside the renderer, is paired with
an entirely separate vulnerability, Issue 1755, inside the core browser process, to achieve
a full exploit chain from the renderer to the rest of the browser. In other words, the
severity of the renderer vulnerability is reduced to such a significant extent due to the
process’ reduced privileges, that even gaining arbitrary code execution inside that process
was insufficent to compromise the target machine. Instead, that attackers needed to find a
separate bug in the browser to escape the renderer’s sandbox and achieve their goal, resulting
in a substantially more complex attack that burned through two unique vulnerablities.
What this shows is that even coarse-grained privilege separation does have pragmatic value:
the attacker work factor is increased as they (1) require additional vulnerabilities to complete
their attacks, and (2) face the increased complexity of reliably chaining together multiple
vulnerabilities per successful attack. The further privileges are separated, the further these
effects are exaggerated as the number of steps between the compromised components (e.g.,
the renderer) and the target component (e.g., the high-privileged browser) increases.
Indeed, although this separated design increases Chrome’s complexity and thus costs of
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development and maintenance, the practioners involved believe the benefits are worth their
cost. In fact, over the years Chrome engineers have continued to push further privilege
separation measures: as of the time of writing, the GPU-acceleration component, auxillary
services such as printing, and the networking services, have each been moved into their
own isolated processes [57]. In a recent talk, the team has expressed their vision of further
isolating the networking and storage services of each individual site into their own isolated
processes, in which perhaps dozens of processes may be spawned per site to perform as much
separation as possible [97]—explicitly, they list performance costs of separation mechanisms
as limiting factor for deploying further privilege separation. What this shows is that prac-
tioners value privilege separation, even when it is coarse-grained. In this light, SCALPEL
can be viewed as a tool for providing practioners with privilege separation that they desire
by enabling the use of a tagged architecture for fine-grained, hardware-accelerated privilege
separation. Notably, however, it approaches the problem from the opposite direction of
incrementally sandboxing components: it starts with a least-privilege decomposition and
relaxes boundaries as needed to reach a performance target.
5.5. Compartmentalization Tag Policy Formulation
In this section we sketch our general policy model for compartmentalizing software using
a tagged architecture. The goal of the compartmentalization policies is to decompose a
system into separate logical protection domains, with runtime enforcement applied to each
to ensure that memory accesses and control-flow transfers are permitted according to the
valid operations granted to that domain. How do we enforce policies like these with a tagged
architecture?
The PIPE provides hardware support for imposing a security monitor on the execution of
each instruction. Whether or not each instruction is permitted to execute can depend on
the tags on the relevant pieces of architectural state (Sec. 5.2.1). For example, we may
have a stored private key that should only be accessible to select cryptographic modules.
We can mark the private key object with a private key tag and the instructions in the
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signing function with a crypto sign tag. Then, when the signing function runs and the
PIPE sees a load operation with instruction tag crypto sign and data tag private key,
it can allow the operation. However, if a video processing function whose instructions are
labeled video encode tries to access the private key, the PIPE will see a load operation with
instruction tag video encode and data tag private key and disallow the invalid access.
In general, to enable compartmentalization policies, we place a Domain-ID label (an integer
identifier) on each instruction in executable memory indicating the logical protection domain
to which the instruction belongs; this enables rules to conditionally permit operations upon
their tagged domain grouping, which serves as the foundation for dividing an application’s
code into isolated domains. Similarly, we tag each object with an Object-ID (also an integer
identifier) to demarcate that object as a unique entity onto which privileges can be granted
or revoked. For static objects, such as global variables and memory mapped devices, these
object identifiers are simply placed onto the tags of the appropriate memory words at
load time. Objects that are allocated dynamically (such as from the heap), require us to
decide how we want to partition out and grant privileges to those objects. We choose to
identify all dynamic objects that are allocated from a particular program point (e.g., a
call to malloc) as a single object class, which we will refer to simply as an object. For
example, all strings allocated from a particular char * name = malloc(16) call are the
same object from SCALPEL’s perspective; this formulation is particularly well-suited to
the PIPE because it enables rules in the rule cache to apply to all such dynamic instances.
It also means that all dynamic objects allocated from the same allocation site must be
treated the same way in terms of their privilege—dynamic objects could be differentiated
further (such as by the calling context of the program point) to provide finer separation,
but we leave such exploration to future work. As a result of these subject and object
identification choices, the number of subjects and objects in a system is fixed at compile
time.
Between pairs of subjects and objects (or in the case of a call or return, between two
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subjects), we would like to grant or deny operations. Accordingly, the tag on each instruction
in executable memory also includes an opgroup field that indicates the operation type of
that instruction. We define four opgroups and each instruction is tagged with exactly one
opgroup: read, write, call, and return. For example, in the RISC-V ISA, the sw, sh, sb, etc.
instructions would compose the write opgroup.
When an instruction is executed, the security monitor determines if the operation is legal
based upon (1) the Domain-ID of the executing instruction, (2) the type of operation
op ∈ {read,write, call, return} being executed, and (3) the Object-ID of the accessed word
of memory (for loads and stores), or the Domain-ID of the target instruction (for calls and
returns). As a result, the set of permitted operations can be expressed as a set of triples
(subject, operation, object) with all other privileges revoked (default deny). In this way, the
security monitor check can be viewed as a simple lookup into a privilege table or access-
control matrix whose dimensions are set by the number of Domain-IDs, Object-IDs and the
four operation types. Such a check can be efficiently implemented in the security monitor
software as single hash table lookup; once validated in software, a privilege of this form is
represented as a single rule that is cached in the PIPE rule cache for hardware-accelerated,
single-cycle privilege validation. Additionally, we define a fifth unprivileged opgroup, which
is placed on instructions that do not represent privileges in our model (e.g., add); these
instructions are always permitted to execute.
We define a compartmentalization as an assignment of each instruction to a Domain-ID , an
assignment of each object to an Object-ID , and a corresponding set of permitted operation
triples (Domain-ID , op, Object-ID). The SCALPEL backend takes a compartmentalization
as an input and then automatically lowers it to a tag policy kernel suitable for enforcement
with the PIPE. In this way, SCALPEL decouples policy construction from the underlying
tag enforcement. The opgroup mapping is the same across all compartmentalizations.
In addition to these privilege checks, the SCALPEL backend also applies three additional
defenses to support the enforcement of the compartmentalization. The first is a write-xor-
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execute policy that prevents the execution of writeable data and the overwrite of executable
code so that an attacker cannot inject new executable code into the system. The second
is that the words of memory inside individual heap objects that store allocator metadata
(e.g., the size of the block) are tagged with a special ALLOCATOR tag. The allocator itself
is placed in a special ALLOCATOR compartment that is granted the sole permission to
access such words; as a result, sharing heap objects between domains permits only access to
the data fields of those objects and not the inlined allocator metadata. Lastly, SCALPEL
is built with the Clang compiler and uses LLVM’s [53] static analysis to compute the set
of instructions that are valid call and return entry points. These are tagged with special
CALL-TARGET and RETURN-TARGET tags, and we apply additional clauses to the
rules to validate that each taken control-flow transfer is both to a permitted domain and
to a legal target instruction; this means that when a call or return privilege is granted, it is
only granted for valid entry and return points.
An advantage of this policy design is that privilege enforcement is conducted entirely in
the tag plane and software does not require refactoring to be protected with SCALPEL.
Lastly, we note that there are multiple ways to encode compartmentalization policies on a
tagged architecture. For example, the current compartment context could be stored on the
program counter tag and updated during domain transitions, rather than from being inferred
from the currently executing code. Some of these alternate formulations may work better
with different concrete tagging architectures. However, for the PIPE, these formulations
are largely equivalent to the above static formulation combined with localizing code into
compartments (and making some decisions about object ownership), and we choose the
static variant for a slight reduction in policy complexity; the choice is not particularly
significant and SCALPEL could produce policies for many such formulations.
5.6. The Tracing Policy
While a motivated developer or security engineer could manually construct a compart-
mentalization for a particular software artifact and provide it to the SCALPEL back-end,
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Figure 23: The set of privileged operations recorded by the tracing policy for three functions
in the FreeRTOS TCP/IP networking stack. SCALPEL uses a tag-based hardware security
monitor to automatically self-learn and then enforce fine-grained privileges like these at
runtime.
SCALPEL seeks to assist in policy derivation by providing a tracing mode (similar to e.g.,
AppArmor [83]) as well as a set of analysis tools for understanding the tradeoffs in differ-
ent decomposition strategies. To this end, we build a compartmentalization tracing policy,
which collects a lower-bound on the privileges exercised by a program as well as rule cache
statistics we use later for policy optimization. While the PIPE architecture was designed for
enforcing security policies, in this case we repurpose the same mechanism for fine-grained,
programmable dynamic analysis. SCALPEL’s tracing policy provides several significant
practical advantages over other approaches by (1) greatly simplifying tracing by running as
a policy replacement on the same hardware and software, (2) directly using the PIPE for
hardware-accelerated self-learning of low-level privileges (3), and making it possible to run
in real environments and on unmodified software.
For the tracing policy, code and objects should be labeled at the finest granularity at which
a security engineer may later want to decompose them into separate domains. On the
code side, we find that function-level tracing provides a good balance of performance and
precision, and so in this work SCALPEL tags each function with a unique Domain-ID
during tracing. As a result, our SCALPEL implementation considers functions to be the
smallest unit of code that can be assigned to a protection domain. Note that this is a
design choice, and the PIPE could collect finer-grained (instruction-level) privileges at a
higher cost to the tracing overhead.
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On the object side, the tracing policy also assigns an Object-ID to each primitive object
in the system. For software written in C, this includes a unique Object-ID for each global
variable, a unique Object-ID for each memory-mapped device/peripheral in the memory
map (e.g., Ethernet, UART), and a unique Object-ID associated with each allocation call
site to an allocator as discussed in Sec. 5.5. All data memory words in a running system
receive an Object-ID from one of these static or dynamic cases.
With these identifiers in place, the tracing policy is then used to record the observed dynamic
behavior of the program. The PIPE invokes a software miss handler when it encounters a
rule that is not in the rule cache. When configured as the tracing policy, the miss handler
simply records the new privileges it encounters—expressed as interactions of Domain-IDs,
operation types, and Object-IDs—as valid privileges that the program should be granted
to perform; it then installs a rule so the program can use that privilege repeatedly without
invoking the miss handler again. Unlike other policies, the tracing policy never returns a
policy violation. We show an example output from the tracing policy in Fig. 23 with iden-
tifiers printed as strings from their source program objects. From this tracing information,
we form a fined-grained function and object graph, where each function and each object is
a node and each privilege is an edge between nodes.
In addition to collecting privileges, the tracing policy also periodically records the rules
that were encountered every Nepoch instructions, which we set to one million. As we’ll
see in later sections (Sec. 5.8), this provides the SCALPEL analysis tools with valuable
information about rule co-locality which it uses to construct low-overhead policies.
5.7. Privilege Quantification Model
In practice, one likely wants to deploy compartmentalizations that are coarser than the trac-
ing policy granularity (i.e., individual functions and C-level objects) to reduce the number
of tags, rules and thus runtime costs associated with policy enforcement. Importantly, the
tracing policy leads to a natural privilege quantification model we can use to compare these
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relaxed decompositions against the finest-grained function/object granularity. We can think
of each rule in the tracing policy (Domain-ID , op, Object-ID) as a privilege, to which we
can assign a weight. The least privilege of an application is the sum of the lower-bound priv-
ileges that it requires to run; without any of these, the program could not perform its task.
For any coarser-grained compartmentalization, we can compute its privilege by counting
up the number of fine-grained privileges it permits, which will include additional privileges
beyond those in the least-privilege set. This enables us to compute the overprivilege ratio
(OR), which we define as the ratio of the privileges allowed by a particular compartmen-
talization compared to the least-privilege minimum; i.e., an OR of 2.0 means that twice as
many privileges are permitted as strictly required. While crude, the OR provides a useful
measure of how much privilege decomposition has been achieved, both to help understand
where various compartmentalization strategies lie in the privilege-performance space and as
an objective function for SCALPEL automatic policy derivation. For our weighting func-
tion, we choose to weight each object and function by its size in bytes; this helps account
for composite data structures such as a struct that may have multiple fields and should
count for additional privilege. Optionally, a developer can manually adjust the weights of
functions or objects relative to other components in the system and interactively rerun the
algorithms to easily tune the produced compartmentalizations.
5.8. Policy Exploration
To assist in creating and exploring compartment policies, SCALPEL provides three com-
partment generation algorithms. The first and simplest such approach, presented in Sec. 5.8.1,
generates compartment boundaries based upon the static source code structure, such as
taking each compilation unit or source code file as a compartment. The second algorithm,
presented in Sec. 5.8.2, instead takes an algorithmic optimization approach that uses the
tracing data to group together collections of mutually interacting functions. This algo-
rithm is parameterized by a target domain size, allowing it to expose many design points,
ranging from hundreds of small compartments to several large compartments. This is an
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architecture-independent approach that broadly has the property that larger compartments
need fewer rules that will compete for space in the rule cache. Lastly, in Sec. 5.8.3 we present
a second algorithmic approach that specifically targets producing efficient policies for the
PIPE architecture; it targets packing policies into working sets of rules for improved cache
characteristics. This algorithm uses both the tracing data and the cache co-locality data
(Sec. 5.6) to produce optimized compartmentalization definitions, and is the capstone algo-
rithm proposed in SCALPEL.
5.8.1. Syntactic Compartments
A simple and commonly-used approach [31, 126] for defining compartment boundaries is
to mirror the static source code structure into corresponding security domains—we call
these the syntactic domains. We define the OS syntactic domain by placing all of the
FreeRTOS code into one compartment (Domain-ID 1) and all of the application code into
a second compartment (Domain-ID 2). This decomposition effectively implements a ker-
nel/userspace separation for an embedded application that does not otherwise have one.
Similarly, the directory syntactic domains are constructed by placing the code that orig-
inates from each directory of source code into a separate domain, i.e., Domain-ID i is
assigned to the code generated from the ith directory of code. Programmers typically
decompose large applications into separate, logically-isolated-but-interacting modules, and
the directory domains implement these boundaries for such systems. Lastly, the file and
function syntactic domains are constructed by assigning a protection domain to each indi-
vidual source code file or function that composes the program. Note that each syntactic
domain is a strict decomposition from the one before it; for example, compilation units are
a sub-decomposition of the OS/application boundary.
For the syntactic compartments, objects are labeled at the fine, individual object granularity
(a fresh Object-ID for each global variable and heap allocation site); afterwards, all objects
with identical permission classes based upon the tracing data are merged together. For
example, if two global variables are accessed only by Domain-ID 1, then they can be joined
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into a single Object-ID with no loss in privilege; however, if one is shared and one is not,
then they must be assigned separate Object-IDs to encode their differing security policies.
A second use we find for the syntactic code domains is applying syntactic constraints to
other algorithms: for example, we can generate compartments algorithmically but disallow
merging code across compilation units to maintain interfaces and preserve the semantic
module separation introduced by the programmer. These results are presented in Sec. 5.10.4.
5.8.2. Domain-Size Compartments
While the syntactic domains allow us to quickly translate source code structure into security
domains, we are ultimately interested in exploring privilege-performance tradeoffs in a more
systematic and data-driven manner than can be provided by the source code itself. We
observe that the output of the tracing policy (Sec. 5.6) is a rich trove of information—
a complete record of the code and object interactions including their dynamic runtime
counts—on top of which we can run optimization algorithms to produce compartments.
Because optimal clustering is known to be NP-Hard [6], we start with the fine-grained
function and object graph and employ a straightforward greedy clustering algorithm that
groups together sets of mutually-interacting functions into domains while reducing unneces-
sary overprivilege. The algorithm is parameterized by Cmax, the maximum number of bytes
of code that are permitted per cluster. The algorithm works as follows: upon initialization,
each function is placed into a separate compartment Ci with size Cisize taken to be the size
(in bytes) of that function. At each step of the algorithm, two compartments CA and CB
are chosen to merge together; the size of the resulting compartment is simply the sum of
the sizes of the compartments being merged: CABsize = CAsize +CBsize . To determine which
two compartments to merge at each merge step, we compute the ratio of a utility function
to that of a cost function for all pairs and select the pair with the highest ratio. The utility
function we use is the number of cross-compartment calls and returns found by the tracing
policy between those two compartments (i.e., their call affinity). The cost function we use
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is the increase in privilege (as given by Sec. 5.7) that would result from the merge: that is,
we would like to identify mutually interacting functions with high affinity and group them
together, while reducing unnecessary overprivilege. The algorithm terminates when no legal
merges remain; that is, no candidates A and B maintain CAsize + CBsize ≤ Cmax.
After completion, each cluster Ci is translated into security domain Domain-ID i and
objects are processed in the same manner as described in 5.8.1. We show results of the
Domain-Size algorithm on our HTTP web server application in Fig. 24. First, Fig. 24 (a)
shows how the number of compartments trends with the Cmax parameter on the HTTP
web server application. As can be seen, the Domain-Size algorithm coupled with a target
size parameter exposes a wide range of compartmentalization strategies, from just a few
compartments up to hundreds. Fig. 24 (b) shows the total number of rules that are required
to represent the compartmentalization policy at that granularity. With fewer compartments
there are fewer unique subject domains, object domains and interaction edges, which means
fewer total rules are required for the design. Fig. 24 (c) shows the dynamic runtime rule
cache miss rate of the compartmentalization produced from that Cmax value. Lastly, Fig. 24
(d) shows how the Overprivilege Ratio trends with target domain size.
5.8.3. Working-Set Compartments
The Domain-Size compartment algorithm allows us to explore a wide range of compart-
mentalization strategies independent of the security architecture, but it is not particularly
well-suited to the PIPE. The utility function that drives cluster merge operation is the
number of dynamic calls and returns between those clusters. For enforcement mechanisms
that impose a cost per domain transition (such as changing capabilities [131] or changing
page tables between processes when using virtual memory process isolation), such a utility
function would be a reasonable choice, as it does lead to minimizing the number of cross-
compartment interactions. Grouping together code and data in this way does reduce the
number of tags, rules, and thus cache characteristics of enforcing the compartmentalization
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Figure 24: Impact of clustering algorithms for the HTTP web server (Sec. 5.10.1) on 1024-
entry rule cache. Top Row: The Domain-Size algorithm. Fig. 24 (a) shows how the number
of compartments in final web server design trends with the Cmax parameter. Fig. 24 (b)
shows how many rules are required to represent the compartmentalization at a given Cmax
value. Fig. 24 (c) shows the runtime rule cache miss rate of the compartmentalization
produced from that Cmax value. Lastly, Fig. 24(d) shows the overprivilege ratio of the
design. Bottom Row: The Working-Set algorithm. Similar to the top row, Fig. 24 (e), (f),
(g), (h) show how the number of compartments, rules, the rule cache miss rate, and the
overprivilege ratio all trend with WSmax parameter in the Working-Set algorithm. Note
how the Working-Set algorithm outperforms the Domain-Size algorithm in terms of the
number of compartments, rules, and overprivilege ratio for the same rule cache miss rate.
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For the PIPE, there is no cost to change domains, provided the required rules are already
cached; instead, what matters is rule locality. As a result, to produce performant policies
for the PIPE, we instead would like to optimize the runtime rule cache characteristics rather
than minimizing the number of domain transitions. To this end, we construct an algorithm
based on reducing the set of rules required by each of a program’s phases so that each set
will fit comfortably into the rule cache for favorable cache characteristics.
How do we identify program phases such that we can consider their cache characteristics?
Recall that the tracing policy records the rules that it encounters during each epoch of
1M instructions (Sec. 5.6). We consider the set of rules encountered during each epoch to
compose a working set. As an intuitive, first-order analysis, if we can keep the rules in each
working set below the cache size and the product of those rules and the miss handling time
small compared to the epoch length, the overhead for misses in the epoch will be small. As
we will see, since not all rules are used with high frequency in an epoch, it isn’t strictly
necessary to reduce the rules in the epoch below the cache size. While there is prior work on
program phase detection [114, 109], SCALPEL takes a simple epoch-based approach that
we see is adequate to generate useful working sets; integrating more sophisticated phase
detection into SCALPEL would be interesting future work and would only improve the
benefits of the PIPE protection policy.
The Working-Set algorithm targets a maximum number of rules allowed per working set,
WSmax. We construct the Working-Set algorithm in a similar fashion to the Domain-Size
algorithm (Sec. 5.8.2) starting with the fine-grained function and object graph, except that
we consider clustering of both subjects and objects simultaneously under a unified cost
function. The algorithm works as follows: upon initialization, each function is placed into
a subject domain Si and each primitive object is placed into a separate object domain Oi.
We then initialize the rules in each working set to those found by the tracing policy during
that epoch. At each step of the algorithm, either a pair of subjects or a pair of objects are
chosen for merging together. The pair that is chosen is the pair with the highest ratio of a
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Figure 25: An example of how the rule savings is calculated for merging the S1 and S2
domains together. In this example, there are five rules (privilege triples) in Working Set
1 before the merge, and three rules afterwards, for a total of two rules saved. However,
S2 did not have write access to O1 before the merge, so overprivilege is also introduced
by the merge. Assuming all components of the system have a uniform weight of one, then
the utility for this merge would be two (two rules saved) and the cost would be one (one
additional privilege exposed), for a ratio of 2/1 = 2. The Working-Set algorithm is driven
by the ratio of rules saved in working sets to the increase in privilege, allowing it to enforce
as much of the fine-grained access control privileges as possible for a given rule cache miss
rate. Note that following the depicted subject merge, merging objects O1 and O2 would
be chosen next by the algorithm, as it would save an additional rule at no further increase
in privilege; in this way, the Working-Set algorithm simultaneously constructs both subject
and object domains.
utility function to that of a cost function across all pairs. In contrast to the Domain-Size
algorithm, the utility function we use is the sum of the rules that would be saved across
all working sets that are currently over the target rule limit WSmax. We show an example
of how the rule delta calculation is performed in Fig. 25. After performing a merge, the
new, smaller set of rules that would be required for each affected working set is calculated,
and then the process repeats. The Working-Set algorithm uses the same cost function as
the Domain-Size algorithm, i.e., the increase in privilege that would result from combining
the two subjects or objects into a single domain. As a result, the Working-Set algorithm
attempts to reduce the number of rules required by the program during each of its program
phases down to a cache-friendly number while minimizing the overprivilege. The algorithm
is run until the number of rules in all the working sets is driven below the target value of
WSmax.
Like the Domain-Size algorithm, we can vary the value of WSmax to produce a range of
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Model Cost (cycles)
CycL1 (64KB, 4-way) 1
CycL2 (512KB, 8-way) 3
CycDRAM (2GB) 100
Cycpolicy eval 300
CycPIPE (DMHC [42], 1024) 1
Table 2: Architectural modeling parameters
compartmentalizations at various privilege-performance tradeoffs. If we set our WSmax
target to match the actual rule cache size, we will pack the policy down to fit comfortably
in the cache and produce a highly performant policy; on the other hand, we find that this
tight restriction isn’t strictly necessary—Fig 24 (g) shows how the rule cache miss rate
trends with the target WSmax value, achieving an almost linear reduction in miss rate with
WSmax.
The core advantage of the Working-Set algorithm is that it is able to coarsen a compartmen-
talization in only the key places where it actually improves the runtime cache characteristics
of the application, while maintaining the majority of fine-grained rules that don’t actually
contribute meaningfully to the rule cache pressure. In Fig 24 (e), (f), (g), (h) we show how
the number of compartments, the number of rules, the rule cache miss rate, and the over-
privilege ratio trend with the WSmax parameter. In contrast to the Domain-Size algorithm,
we can see that many more compartments and rules are maintained as the algorithms are
driven to smaller and smaller rule cache miss rates, demonstrating the advantages of the
Working-Set algorithm in intelligently producing compartmentalization policies at much
lower levels of overprivilege. For example, at the WSmax of 1024 the Working-Set algo-
rithm achieves the same rule cache miss rate as the Domain-Size algorithm does at a Cmax
of 16,364, but it has more than twice as many total rules and an Overprivilege Ratio that is
twice as small, a much more privilege-restricted design for the same overhead. We illustrate
the differences between the algorithms more directly in Sec. 5.10 (Evaluation).
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5.9. Performance Model
Our SCALPEL evaluation targets a single-core, in-order RISC-V CPU that is extended with
the PIPE tag-based hardware security monitor. To match a typical, lightweight embedded
processor [78], we assume 64KB L1 data and instruction caches and a unified 512KB L2
cache.
To this we add a 1,024 entry DMHC [42] PIPE rule cache. The application is a single,
statically-linked program image that includes both the FreeRTOS operating system as well
as the program code. The image is run on a modified QEMU that simulates data and
rule caches inline with the program execution to collect event statistics. SCALPEL is built
ontop of an open-source PIPE framework that includes tooling for creating and running tag
policies [74]. The architectural modeling parameters we use are given in Tab. 2. We use
the following model for baseline execution time:
Tbaseline = Ninst + NL1Imiss × CycL2 + NL1Dmiss × CycL2 + NL2miss × CycDRAM
Beyond the baseline, SCALPEL policies add overhead time to process misses:
TSCALPEL = Tbaseline + NPIPEmiss × Cycpolicy eval
We take Cycpolicy eval to be 300 cycles based on calibration measurements from our hash
lookup implementation.







In this section we present the results of our SCALPEL evaluation. Sec. 5.10.1 details the
applications we use to conduct our experiments. Sec. 5.10.2 shows statistics about the ap-
plications and the results of the tracing policy. Sec. 5.10.3 shows the privilege-performance
results of SCALPEL’s Domain-Size and Working-Set algorithms. Sec. 5.10.4 shows the
Syntactic Domains and the results of applying the syntactic constraints to the Working-Set
algorithm. Lastly, Sec. 5.10.5 shows how SCALPEL’s Working-Set rule clustering technique
can be used to pack entire policies for real-time systems.
5.10.1. Applications
Web Server: One application we use to demonstrate SCALPEL is an HTTP web server
built around the FreeRTOS + FAT + TCP demo application [112]. Web servers are com-
mon portals for interacting with embedded/IoT devices, such as viewing baby monitors or
configuring routers. Our final system includes a TCP networking stack, a FAT file system,
an HTTP web server implementation, and a set of CGI programs that compose a simple
hospital management system. The management system allows users to login as patients
or doctors, view their dashboard, update their user information, and perform various op-
erations such as searches, prescribing medications, and checking prescription statuses. All
parts of the system are written in C and are compiled together into a single program image.
To drive the web server in our experiments, we use curl [34] to generate web requests.
The driver program logs in as a privileged or unprivileged user, performs random actions
available from the system as described above, and then logs out. For the tracing policy,
we run the web server for 500 web requests with a 0.25s delay between requests, which we
observe is sufficient to cover the web server’s behavior. For performance evaluation, we run
5 trials of 100 requests each and take the average.
libXML Parsing Library: Additionally, we port the libXML2 [102] parsing library to
our FreeRTOS stack. To drive the library, we construct a simple wrapper around the
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xmlTextReader SAX interface which parses plain XML files into internal XML data struc-
tures. For our evaluation experiments, we run it on the MONDIAL XML database [52],
which contains aggregated demographic and geographic information. It is 1MB in size and
contains 22k elements and 47k attributes. Parsing structured data is common in many
applications and is also known to be error-prone and a common source of security vul-
nerabilities: libXML2 has had 65 CVEs including 36 memory errors between 2003 and
2018 [40]. Our libXML2 is based on version 2.6.30. Timing-dependent context switches
causes nondeterministic behavior; we run the workload 5 times and take the average.
H264 Video Encoder, bzip2, GNU Go: Additionally, we port three applications from
the SPEC benchmarks that have minimal POSIX dependencies (e.g., processes or filesys-
tems) to our FreeRTOS stack. Porting the benchmarks involved translating the main func-
tion to a FreeRTOS task, removing their reliance on configuration files by hardcoding their
execution settings, and integrating them with the FreeRTOS dynamic memory allocator.
The H264 Video Encoder is based on 464.h264ref, the bzip2 compression workload is based
on 401.bzip2, and the GNU Go implementation is based on 445.gobmk. Video encoders
are typical for any systems with cameras (baby monitors, smart doorbells), compression
and decompression are common for data transmission, and search implementations may be
found in simple games or navigation devices. We run the H264 encoder on the reference
SSS.yuv, a video with 171 frames with a resolution of 512x320 pixels. We run bzip2 on the
reference HTML input and the reference blocking factors. We run GNU Go in benchmark-
ing mode, where it plays both black and white, on an 11x11 board with 4 random initial
stones. Timing-dependent context switches causes nondeterministic behavior; we run each
workload 5 times and take the average.
5.10.2. Application Statistics, The Tracing Policy, and Rule Cache Miss Rates
In Tab. 3 we show the application statistics of our workloads and the results of the tracing
policy. First, to give a broad sense for the application sizes, we show the total lines of code;
this column includes only the application, on top of which there is an additional 12k lines of
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Application Lines of Code Live Functions Live Objects Total Rules Monolithic OR
bzip2 8k 128 109 2,880 39
Web Server 49k 1,231 218 12,025 96
H264 53k 363 692 19,641 244
GNU Go 198k 3,288 10,532 30,077 187
libXML 290k 260 384 10,221 538















































































Figure 26: The impact of the WSmax parameter on the rule cache miss rate for a 1024-
entry rule cache. The max value corresponds to the tracing-level granularity (Tab. 3) and
the solid lines show how the rule cache miss rate trends with WSmax. As can be seen,
the SCALPEL algorithms allow a designer to generate compartmentalization designs that
target any desired rule cache miss rate. The dashed lines show the even lower rule cache
miss rate that is achieved by prefetching rules, which we describe in Sec. 5.11.
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core FreeRTOS code. Next, we show the total number of live functions and objects logged
by the tracing policy during the program’s execution. These subjects and objects compose
the fine-grained privileges that SCALPEL enforces. In the Total Rules column we show the
total number of unique rules generated during the entire execution of the program under
the tracing policy granularity (Sec. 5.6). While this number indicates the complexity of the
program’s data and control graph, it is not necessarily predictive of the cache miss rate,
which depends on the dynamic rule locality. We show the rule cache hit in Fig. 26: the
rightmost point (max) corresponds to the miss rate at the tracing policy granularity. As
can be seen, the web server has fewer rules than libXML, but also has a lower cache hit rate
due to the larger amount of logic that runs at its steady-state web serving phases (such as
receiving network requests, parsing them, running CGI programs and sending output). In
contrast, H264 has more total rules, but exhibits more locality as it spends long program
phases on a small subset of code and data (e.g., doing motion estimation), a much more
rule-cache friendly workload. Very simple workloads, such as bzip2, require only a couple
thousand rules rules and have effectively no rule cache misses even at the tracing-level
granularity.
5.10.3. Privilege-performance Tradeoffs
A key question we would like to answer is how we can trade-off privilege for performance on
a per-application basis using the range of SCALPEL compartment generation algorithms
(Sec. 5.8). First, Fig. 26 shows how the rule cache miss rate trends with the WSmax
parameter to the Working-Set algorithm: as can be seen, it allows a designer to target any
desired rule cache miss rate for an application.
To explore these compartmentalization options, in Fig. 27 we show the privilege-performance
curves (where each compartmentalization design is scored by its overhead and Overprivilege
Ratio) generated from the both the Domain-Size algorithm and the Working-Set algorithms.
The top-left point in the Domain-Size algorithm corresponds to the tracing-level granular-
ity; this point enforces the full, fine-grained access control matrix, but also imposes large
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overheads; for example, on the web server application, the cost of enforcement is >100%.
The other points in this line correspond to larger values of the Cmax parameter, which pro-
duces fewer, larger compartments for more favorable runtime overheads; however, as can
be seen, these coarser compartmentalizations also introduce additional overprivilege. The
Working-Set lines in the plots correspond to the range of compartmentalizations produced
from the Working-Set algorithm and its WSmax parameter. The top-left point corresponds
to the maximum value of WSmax where no clustering is performed, and the bottom-right
point corresponds to packing the rules in each working set to the rule cache size (1,024),
producing designs that have very favorable performance characteristics but more overpriv-
ilege.
Note that in both cases the curves have a very steep downward slope, meaning large im-
provements in runtime performance can be attained with little increases in privilege; the
curves eventually flatten out, at which point additional decreases in overhead come at
the expense of larger amounts of overprivilege. Note that the Working-Set compartments
strictly dominate the Domain-Size compartments, producing more privilege reduction at
lower costs than the Domain-Size counterparts. As can be seen, SCALPEL allows designers
to easily explore the tradeoffs in compartmentalization tag policies. These runs represent
the default, fully-automatic toolflow. A designer can then easily inspect the produced com-
partmentalization files, tune the privilege weights, and rerun the tools interactively as time
and expertise allow.
5.10.4. Syntactic Compartments and Syntactic Constraints
In Fig. 28a we show the syntactic compartments (Sec. 5.8.1) on the HTTP web server ap-
plication. Unlike the Domain-Size and Working-Set algorithms, which are parameterized
to produce a wide range of compartmentalization options, the syntactic compartments only
provide a handful of decomposition choices. And, as can be seen, none of the options are
competitive compared to the Domain-Size of Working-Set decompositions, which suggests



































































































































Figure 27: The range of compartmentalizations produced from SCALPEL’s algorithms on
a 1024-entry rule cache. Each point corresponds to a single specific concrete compartmen-
talization that is run for performance evaluation and characterized by its runtime overhead
(Y axis) and aggregate Overprivilege Ratio (X axis). The Domain-Size line shows compart-
ments that are generated from the various values of Cmax to the Domain-Size algorithm,
and the Working-Set line shows compartments that are generated from the various values
of WSmax to the Working-Set algorithm. As can be seen, SCALPEL allows a security
engineer to rapidly create and evaluate many compartmentalization strategies to explore
design tradeoffs without the excessive labor required for manual separations. Note that the
Working-Set algorithm dominates the Domain-Size algorithm, with a particularly strong
advantage at the low-end of the overhead spectrum.
cated techniques.
However, it is also true that software engineers often decompose their own projects into
modules, and those modules boundaries bear semantic information about code interfaces
and relationships. For example, the web server application has the core FreeRTOS code in
one directory, the TCP/IP networking stack in another directory, the web server application
(CGI app) in another directory, and the FAT filesystem implementation in another separate
directory. When the algorithmic compartment generation algorithms (Secs. 5.8.2, 5.8.3)
optimize for privilege-performance design points, they have the full freedom to reconstruct
boundaries in whatever way they find produces better privilege-performance tradeoffs. How-
ever, if we would like to preserve the original syntactic boundaries during the algorithmic
optimization process, we can add additional constraints, such as a syntactic constraint,
which limits the set of legal merges allowed by the algorithms. For example, under the
file syntactic constraint, two global variables can only be merged if they originate from the


























(a) The privilege-performance points generated
by the Syntactic Domains (Sec. 5.8.1). Unlike
the Domain-Size and Working-Set algorithms,
the Syntactic Domains only provide a handful

































































(b) Impact of syntactic constraints. The
algorithmic compartment algorithms
(Sec. 5.8.2, 5.8.3) can optionally take an
additional constraint, such as a syntactic
boundary, that must be respected while cre-
ating the compartmentalization. In this case,
we show the application of three syntactic
domains to the Working-Set algorithm.
Figure 28: Privilege-Performance impact of Syntactic Domains and Constraints on the
HTTP web server running on a 1024-entry rule cache.
ule while respecting the interfaces to that module. We note that a compartmentalization
that is a strict sub-decomposition of another compartmentalization is never less secure.
In Fig. 28b we show the application of the syntactic domains as constraints to the Working-
Set algorithm. The OS restriction adds little additional overhead to the produced design
points but guarantees a cleaner separation of the OS and application than may be found
by the algorithms naturally. On the other hand, the file constraint is very restrictive,
reducing the number of moves available to the algorithms to such a large extent that many
of the WSmax targets fail to generate.
1 These examples illustrate the benefits of the rapid
exploration enabled by SCALPEL, and we note that a manually-constructed constraint can
be a very convenient method for interacting with SCALPEL’s automation.
1Note that the Working-Set algorithm can only perform merge operations between code or object domains
that are found to co-reside in the same epoch, which means that they may not reach the same minimum
overhead as the corresponding syntactic domain.
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5.10.5. Packing Policies for Real-Time Systems
The ideas presented in the Working-Set algorithm (Sec. 5.8.3) can be used to pack an en-
tire security policy (i.e., the complete set of rules that compose the policy) into a single,
fixed-size set of rules. For this construction, we simply take the union of all rules required
to represent the policy and present it to the Working-Set algorithm as a single working
set—the entire policy will then be packed down to a number of rules equal to WSmax.
Importantly, this means that the policy can be loaded in a constant amount of time, and
assuming the WSmax matches the rule cache size, then no additional runtime rule resolu-
tions will occur, giving the system predictable runtime characteristics suitable for real-time
systems. We show the results of this technique in Tab. 4 when applied to a range of rule
targets. The overprivilege points generated from this technique could be used to decide on
a particular rule cache size for a specific embedded application to achieve target protection
and performance characterstics. Note that the working-set cached case achieves lower OR
at a the same 1024-entry rule capacity since it only needs to load one working-set at a time.
It will take a larger rule cache to achieve comparably low OR. However, it is worth noting
that, if the rule memory does not need to act as a cache, it can be constructed more cheaply
than a dynamically managed cache, meaning the actual area cost is lower than the ratio
of rules, and might even favor the fixed-size rule memory. Furthermore, if one is targeting
a particular application, the tag bits can also be reduced to match the final compartment
and object count (e.g., can be 8b instead of a full word width), which will further decrease
the per rule area cost.
5.11. Prefetching
Finally, we consider one last performance optimization to reduce the overhead costs of
SCALPEL’s policies: rule prefetching. During the normal operation of the PIPE, rules are
evaluated and installed into the rule cache only when an application misses on that rule.
When such a miss occurs, the PEX core awakens, evaluates the rule, and finally installs
it into the rule cache. Much like prefetching instructions or data blocks for processor
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Real-Time Rule Target
Application 512 1024 2048 4096 8192
bzip2 2.82 1.34 1.01 1.00 1.000
Web Server 8.92 5.76 2.71 1.35 1.005
H264 11.9 2.81 1.46 1.05 1.002
libXML 12.3 7.46 2.61 1.18 1.000
Gnu Go 29.4 12.7 3.47 1.43 1.033
Table 4: The Overprivilege Ratio (OR) of the applications when they are packed for real-
time performance to the given total rule count. When packed in this way, they can be (1)
loaded in constant time and (2) experience no additional runtime rule resolutions, making
them suitable for real-time systems.
caches [87], there is an opportunity for the PEX core to preemptively predict and install
rules into the cache. Such a technique can greatly reduce the number of runtime misses that
occur, provided that the required rules can reliably be predicted and prefetched before they
are needed. In this section we explore the design and results of a rule prefetching system.
5.11.1. The Rule-Successor Graph
The core data structure of our prefetching design is the Rule-Successor Graph. The Rule-
Successor Graph is a directed, weighted graph that records the immediate temporal rela-
tionships of rule evaluations. A rule is represented as a node in the graph, and a weighted
edge between two nodes indicates the relative frequency of the miss handler evaluating the
source rule followed immediately by evaluating the destination rule.
Fig. 29(a) shows an example function from the FreeRTOS FAT filesystem, and Fig. 29(b)
shows the Rule-Successor Graph for its function-entry rule. When this function is called, it
issues loads and stores to the task’s stack, and then it issues loads to the crc16 table high
and crc16 table low global variables in exactly that order; this deterministic sequence is
learned and encoded in the Rule-Successor Graph. Many kinds of rule relationships are
highly predictable, such as rules that are required for sequential instructions in the same
basic block.
On the other hand, data or control-flow dependent program behavior can produce less
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(a) The GetCRC16 function in the FreeRTOS FAT
Filesystem.
(b) The Rule-Successor Graph for the GetCRC16
function. Each rule (privilege triple) is shown as
a rectangle with three fields corresponding to the
subject, operation and object tags.
Figure 29: The Rule-Successor Graph, a data structure used by SCALPEL’s prefetching
system
predictable rule sequences—for example, a return instruction can have many, low-weighted
rule successors if that function is called from many locations within a program. In this
example, GetCRC16 has two callers and may return to either, although one is much more
common than the other; similarly, GetCRC16 also accepts a data pointer pbyData which
could produce data-dependent rule sequences depending on the object it points to, although
in this program it always points to the task’s stack, which does not require another rule.
Lastly, if stLength were 0, then the program would take an alternate control-flow path and
several of the rules would be skipped. Like other architectural optimizations such as caches
and branch predictors [51], optimistic prefetching accelerates common-case behavior, but
may have a negative impact on performance when the prediction is wrong.
A program’s Rule-Successor Graph can be generated from the miss handler software with
no other changes to the system. To do so, the miss handler software simply maintains an
account of the last rule that it handled. When a new miss occurs, the miss handler software
updates the Rule-Successor Graph by updating the weight from the last rule to the current
rule (and adding any missing nodes). Finally, the record of which rule was the last rule is
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updated to the current rule, and the process continues.
5.11.2. Generating Prefetching Policies
A prefetching policy is a mapping from each individual rule (called the source rule) to a
list of rules (the prefetch rules) that are to be prefetched by the miss handler when a miss
occurs on that source rule. Prefetching policies are generated offline using a program’s
Rule-Successor Graph; the goal is to determine which rules (if any) should be prefetched
from each source rule on future runs of that program.
To find good candidate prefetch rules for each source rule, we deploy a Breadth-First Search
algorithm on the Rule-Successor Graph to discover high likelihood, subsequent rules. Each
such search begins on a source rule with an initial probability p = 1.0. When a new node
(rule) is explored by the search algorithm, its relative probability is calculated by multiplying
the current probability by the weight of the edge taken. When a new, unexplored rule is
discovered, it is added to a table of explored nodes, and its depth and probability are
recorded with it. If a rule is already in the table when it is explored from a different path,
then the running probability is added to the value in the table to reflect the sum of the
probabilities of the various paths on which the rule may be found.
The algorithm terminates searching on any path in which the probability falls below a
minimum threshold value. We set this value to 0.1%, which we observe sufficiently captures
the important rules across our benchmarks. After search is complete, the table of explored
nodes is populated and ready to be used for deriving prefetching policies. To test the impact
of various degrees of prefetching, we add a pruning pass in which any rules below a target
probability pmin are discarded from the table. For example, if pmin is set to the maximum of
1.0, then rules are only included in the prefetching set if they are always observed to occur
in the Rule-Successor Graph following the source rule. On the other hand, Lower pmin run
a higher risk of both not averting future misses, and in the worst-case may pollute the rule
cache by evicting a potentially more-important rule. In Fig. 29(b), the bottom left rule has
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a probability of 0.78. If no rules remain after pruning, then no prefetch rules are found.
Otherwise, the remaining rules are sorted to compose the final list of prefetch rules. They
are sorted by depth (smallest first), then within the same depth by probability (highest
first) to order the rules in a sequence most likely to be useful. We vary the values of pmin
from 1.0 to 0.25 to explore the impact of various levels of prefetching on final performance.
5.11.3. Prefetching Cost Model
When the PIPE misses on a rule, it traps and alerts the PEX core for rule evaluation. In
SCALPEL, a rule evaluation is a hash table lookup that checks the current operation against
a privilege table (Sec. 5.5). When prefetching is enabled, we choose to store the prefetch
rules in the privilege hash table along with the source rule to which they belong. When a
miss occurs, the miss handler performs the initial privilege lookup on the source rule and
installs it into the PIPE cache, allowing the AP core to resume processing. Afterwards, the
PEX core continues to asynchronously load and install the rest of the prefetch rules in that
hash table entry. Assuming a cache line size of 64B and a rule size of 28B (five 4B input tags
and two 4B output tags), then two rules fit in a single cache line. As such, the first prefetch
rule can be prepared for insertion immediately following the resolution of the source rule.
We assume a 10 cycle install time into the PIPE cache for each rule installation. For each
subsequent cache line (which can hold up to two rules), we add an additional cost of 20
cycles for a DRAM CAS operation, in addition to the 10 cycle insertion time for each rule.
We set the maximum number of prefetch rules to seven so that all eight rules (including the
source rule) may fit onto a single same DRAM page, assuming a 2048b page size. Our data
shows that this number is sufficient to capture a majority of the benefits of prefetching on
our workloads.
We begin by looking at the structure of the Rule-Successor Graph (Fig. 30a) from our
various applications to get a sense for the number and likelihood of prefetch rules per
source rule that might be prefetched; the more high-likelihood rules there are, the more

















































































































































































(b) The impacts of prefetching on the privilege-
performance curves generated from the Working-
Set algorithm. The red line shows the baseline
case (no prefetching), and the other lines corre-
spond to the prefetching policies generated from
the shown pmin values.
Figure 30: The results of the SCALPEL’s rule prefetching system.
probability in the range of [0.25,1], and the Y axis shows the average number of rules per
source rule that have at least the given cutoff probability. The data shows that there around
five rules per source rule that can be prefetched even at the maximum pmin value of 1.0
(i.e., they always follow the source rule during tracing) in our benchmarks; H264 and bzip2
are more predictabile than the other three benchmarks with values closer to ten. At lower
values of pmin, more rules make the cutoff, although the slope is low (less than one rule on
average per 10% decrease in likelihood) meaning there are significantly diminishing returns
on prefetching larger numbers of rules.
Next, to see the the results of prefetching on rule cache miss rate, we show the prefetching
cases as dashed lines in Fig. 26. To see the final impact on program overhead, Fig. 30b
shows the resulting privilege-performance curves generated from the various prefetching
policies. The red line shows the baseline (no prefetching) case, and the other lines show
the prefetching policies generated from the various values of pmin. All of the prefetching
cases strictly dominate the baseline case on privilege and performance; the yellow line
(pmin = 1.0) captures a majority of the benefits, but each additional relaxation to pmin
continues to lower enforcement costs for the same privilege reduction level in diminishing
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amounts. On the high end of the overhead spectrum (i.e., the tracing-level granularity),
the prefetching system reduces the overhead from an average of 105% to only 27%, a 3.9X
reduction in overhead costs. This shows the predictable nature of the PIPE rules in a
compartmentalization policy and the large benefit of prefetching rules to reduce costs. On
the lower end of the overhead spectrum, the benefits of prefetching are less pronounced
but do enable the system to achieve even finer privilege separation at the same costs: at
overhead of 10%, the prefetching cases allow for 20% more rules and an OR that is 12%
smaller.
5.12. Security, Overprivilege and Work-factor
Vulnerabilities such as memory safety errors permit a program to perform behaviors that
violate its original language-level abstractions, e.g., they allow a program to perform an
access to a memory location that is either outside the object from which the pointer is
derived or has since been freed and is therefore temporally expired. An exploit developer has
the task of using such a vulnerability to corrupt the state of the machine and to redirect the
operations of the new, emergent program such as to reach new states that violate underlying
security boundaries or assumptions, such as changing an authorization level, leaking private
data, or performing system calls with attacker-controlled inputs. In practice, bugs come
in a wide range of expressive power, and even memory corruption vulnerabilities are often
constrained in one or more dimensions, e.g., a typical contiguous overflow error may only
write past the end of an existing buffer [105], or an off-by-one-error allows an attacker to
write a pointer value past the end of an array but gives the attacker no control of the written
data [17]. Modern exploits are typically built from exploit chains in which a series of bugs
are assembled together to achieve arbitrary code execution [17], and complex exploits take
many man-months of effort to engineer [16] even in the monolithic environments in which
they run.
The privilege separation defenses imposed by SCALPEL limit the reachability of memory
accesses and control-flow instructions to a small subset of the full machine’s state. These
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(a) A buffer overflow vulnerability in the Web
Server’s search functionality. The vulnerable CGI
program can be reached and triggered by any user
who browsers to the search.html page. This
vulnerability allows an attacker to corrupt the
user auth and session table variables.
(b) The symbol table showing the addresses and
sizes of several of the symbols in the Web Server’s
data section.
Figure 31
restrictions affect the attacker’s calculus in two ways: first, they may lower the impact of
bugs sufficiently to disarm them entirely, i.e., rendering them unable to impart meaningful
divergence from the original program. Second, they may vastly increase the number of
exploitation steps and bugs required to reach a particular target from a given vulnerabil-
ity: an attacker must now perform repeated confused deputy attacks [59] at each stage to
incrementally reach a target; when privilege reduction is high, these available operations
become substantially limited, thus driving up attacker costs and defeating attack paths for
which no exploit can be generated due to the imposed privilege separation limitations.
We illustrate these ideas with a vulnerability example from the Web Server application
in Fig. 31. A buffer overflow in the search CGI code is reachable from the server’s web
interface and can cause the program to write beyond the end of the condition buffer
onto objects located at higher addresses, which are the user auth and session table
variables. Corrupting user auth can allow an unprivileged user to escalate their privileges.
However, the fault is entirely contained if user auth is tagged with an Object-ID for which
CgiArgValue does not have write permission, because any out-of-bounds write will incur
a policy violation. In Tab. 5 we show the range of compartmentalizations generated from
the Working-Set algorithm. Row 1 shows the compartmentalization’s Overprivilege Ratio,
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and row 2 shows whether the user auth overwrite is prevented (which we verify against our
policy implementation by triggering the buffer overflow to classify as or X in the table). If
that write is not prevented, then an attacker can (1) escalate their privileges, and (2) there
is also an possibility to corrupt the subsequent session table as well if that object is also
writable from CgiArgValue. The session table is a structure that contains a hash table
root node, which includes a code pointer session table->compare. Like the user auth
object, this object is protected if the CgiArgValue code does not have permission to write
to it. We show this relationship in row 3. If it can be corrupted, it could provide additional
footing to compromise the contained compartment, such as through hijacking the program’s
control flow by overwriting the session table->compare field.
While we have illustrated that these specific vulnerabilities are eliminated at specific higher
compartmentalization levels and lower ORs, we expect this trend to generally hold for other
vulnerabilities—as OR lowers, at some point each specific vulnerability based on a privilege
violation is eliminated. Each vulnerability may, in general, be eliminated at a different
OR. Consequently, we expect lower OR to generally correlate well with lower vulnerability.
Lastly, in row 4 we show the total number of legal call targets that are permitted by
the domain containing HashTableEqual (the only function in the program that performs
indirect calls using session table->compare) to show the reachability of such a control-
flow hijack. What this shows is that even if the code pointer is corrupted, the attacker
is limited to only a handful of options to continue their attack, which for many of our
domains is around ten or less; furthermore, even those targets are all functions related
to the hash table operations, which would require further steps still to reach other parts
of the system. In other words, both examples show there is a relationship between the
overprivilege permitted to each component of a system and the effort expended by exploit
developers to weaponize their bugs to reach their targets.
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WSmax max 3200 2800 2400 2000 1800 1600 1400 1200 1024 512
Overprivilege Ratio (OR) 1.00 1.02 1.04 1.08 1.17 1.26 1.36 1.53 1.92 2.43 8.42
Protect user auth X X X
Protect session table X X
HashTableEqual call targets 1 1 1 1 7 7 11 12 17 67 241
Table 5: The relationship between WSmax, the Overprivilege Ratio, and the exploitability
of a vulnerability in the Web Server. We validate the and X vulnerability assignments
by running the Web Server with the policy shown and triggering the buffer overflow vul-
nerability. Lastly, we show the number of call targets reachable from the HashTableEqual
function under the given compartmentalization if its code pointer is corrupted.
5.13. Future Work
5.13.1. Privilege Metric Extensions
The Overprivilege Ratio (OR) is presented here in its simplest form, in which all objects and
functions are weighted by their size in bytes. This weighting scheme is appropriate under the
a priori assumption that all privileges are equal, i.e., larger data structures contain more
fields and thus should account for more privilege than smaller ones, and also that larger
functions tend to have more privileges than smaller ones and should likewise be weighted
higher in their privilege. However, in reality, all objects and operation types are not of equal
security importance to attackers under a concrete threat model. To better represent object
privilege, one should consider the attack paths that they would like to prevent: a defense can
only be analyzed under a particular threat model, and so it is from that threat model that
one should turn to derive privilege weights. For example, in classic memory safety exploits,
code pointers are of high priority to attackers, and thus preserving their integrity is of great
security value [73] compared to other data in the system. Data pointers, in turn, typically
have a security impact that is dependent on the objects and operation types to which
they grant the program access. For example, a data pointer with write permission might be
usable for a memory corruption, while a read-only data pointer may only have value in what
it can leak to an attacker. We can also consider which particular objects are more important
than others: some data objects may be of little significance (such as the bytes composing a
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large image), whereas other objects (such as control or authorization data) may be of great
practical significance. Furthermore, objects may be more or less significant under different
operation types: security keys, for example, may be highly sensitive to reads (i.e., secrecy
is highly valued), whereas control data may be only impactful to attackers when it can be
overwritten (i.e., integrity is highly valued). The privilege model is well-equipped to handle
these cases by providing per-object and per-operation type weights to capture the relative
importance of these privileges as one adapts their weights to match their threat model.
To better model code privilege, we note that there is a great variance in the number and
significance of privileges that are granted to each function (or finer-grained piece of code),
and that this property could also be captured with a privilege weight. Code with high
privilege, both in terms of what objects it may access and what other code it may call or
return to, should be weighted higher than other, less-privileged code. For example, one
could weight the privilege of a function call in proportion to the callee’s privileges. As such,
the ability to call a function with access to an important, critical object could be treated
(perhaps correctly) as significant as access to the object itself. As one can see, there is a
rich space available to capture domain-specific security knowledge in our privilege model to
tune our automation in such a way as to better match the threat models, object importance,
and security assumptions under which they will operate. In whatever way one deems most
appropriate to tune their weights, the algorithms and approach presented here apply just
the same. Exploring these extensions to SCALPEL’s OR would be interesting future work.
5.13.2. On Correlating OR with Security
In Sec. 5.12 we presented an attack example to illustrate the benefits of privilege reduction
and in Sec. 5.13.1 we illustrated some of the ways that the privilege metric can be tuned
to match a concrete threat model. Nonetheless, a key missing piece in the quantitative
approach to privilege separation is a deeper study on the relationship between the privilege
metric, its resulting security impact in practice under a concrete threat model, and the
most effective weighting schemes under that threat model to make best use of the available
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privileges separation resources.
5.13.3. Applying Prefetching to Other Policies
The prefetching technique introduced in Sec. 5.11 was shown to be highly effective at ac-
celerating SCALPEL’s compartmentalization policies due to the highly-predictable rule
sequences that they tend to produce. It is likely that rule prefetching could be applied
successfully to other kinds of micropolicies as well. For example, the stack protection poli-
cies (Chapter 3) would could be a good candidate for prefetching: many stack-related
operations (storing stack control data, initializing frame tags, accessing data elements, etc.)
occur each time a function is called which means those rules will likely be highly predictable
as well. As a result, prefetching has promise to reduce enforcement costs for policies beyond
compartmentalization.
5.14. Comparisons with Related Embedded System Security Work
Hex-Five’s MultiZone Security [61] is a state-of-the-art compartmentalization framework
for RISC-V. However, it requires a developer to manually decompose the application into
separated binaries called “zones”, each of which are very coarse grained—the recommended
decomposition is one zone for FreeRTOS, one for the networking stack, and one or several for
the application. MultiZone Security requires hundreds of cycles to switch contexts, which is
negligible when only employed at millisecond intervals, but the overprivilege is very high, as
large software components still have no separation; as a result, MultiZone Security achieves
a privilege reduction that falls in between the OS and dir syntactic points shown in Fig. 28a.
SCALPEL imposes significantly finer grained separation and provides substantially easier
policy development and exploration. MINION [68] is another compartmentalization tool
for embedded systems. However, it also enforces only very coarse-grained separation by
switching between a small number of memory views and provides no method for exploring
policies to tune protection and performance characterstics.
ACES [31] is closer to SCALPEL in terms of providing automatic separation for applications,
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however it targets enforcement using the handful of segments provided by the MPU. ACES
has negligible overhead for some applications, but 20-30% overhead is more typical, with
some applications requiring over 100% overhead. As a close comparison point, we ran
the Domain-Size algorithm with a few modifications to target four code and four object
domains; the resulting design for the HTTP web server application has an OR of 28.7
compared to SCALPEL’s OR of 1.26 (at a WSmax of 1800 for a comparable overhead),
which is more than 20× more separation at that level; including prefetching, that same
level of protection can be enforced at an overhead that is 3X lower. As a result, SCALPEL
shows that a hardware tag-based security monitor can be used to provide unprecedented
levels of privilege separation for embedded systems.
5.15. Runtime Modes and Dynamic Analysis
5.15.1. Runtime Modes
SCALPEL has two primary runtime modes: alert mode and enforcment mode. In alert
mode, SCALPEL does not terminate a program if a policy violation is encountered; instead,
it produces a detailed log of the privilege violations that have been observed; this mode could
provide near real-time data for intrusion detection and forensics in the spirit of Transparent
Computing [36]. Alternatively, in strict mode, any policy violation produces fail-stop
behavior.
5.15.2. Dynamic Analysis Limitations
SCALPEL uses dynamic analysis to capture the observed low-level operations performed
by a program. Observing dynamic behavior is important for SCALPEL to capture perfor-
mance statistics to build performant policies (Sec. 5.8). However, this also means that our
captured traces represent a lower bound of the true privileges that might be exercised by a
program, which could produce false positives in enforcement mode. There are a number
of ways to handle this issue, and SCALPEL is agnostic to that choice. In cases where
extensive test suites are available or can be constructed, one might use precise SCALPEL;
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that is, the traced program behavior serves as a ground truth for well-behaved programs
and any violations produce fail-stop behavior; some simpler embedded systems applications
may fit into this category. For higher usability on more complex software, SCALPEL could
be combined with static analysis techniques for a hybrid policy design. In that case, the
policy construction proceeds exactly as described in this paper for capturing important per-
formance effects, but the allowed interactions between Domain-IDs and Object-IDs would
be relaxed to the allowed sets as found by static analysis. The best choice among these
options will depend on security requirements, the quality and availability of test suites, and
the tolerable failure rate of the protected application. We consider these issues orthogonal
to SCALPEL’s primary contributions.
5.16. Conclusion
We presented SCALPEL, a tool for producing highly-performant compartmentalization
policies for the PIPE architecture. The SCALPEL back-end is a policy compiler that
automatically lowers compartmentalization policies to the PIPE for hardware-accelerated
enforcement. The SCALPEL front-end provides a set of compartment generation algorithms
to help a security engineer explore the privilege-performance tradeoff space that can be
achieved with the PIPE. The capstone algorithm presented in SCALPEL constructs policies
by targetting a limit on the number of rules during each of a program’s phases to achieve
highly favorable cache characteristics. We show that the same technique can be used to
produce designs with predictable runtime characteristics suitable for real-time systems.
All together, SCALPEL shows that the PIPE can use fine-grained privilege separation with
hundreds of compartments to achieve a very low overprivilege ratio with very low overheads.
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CHAPTER 6 : Conclusion
Programmable, tag-based hardware security monitors like the PUMP can express and en-
force instruction-level security policies. The focus of this dissertation is policy engineering,
i.e., the construction of policies that can (1) provide useful security properties, (2) impose
low costs of enforcement, and (3) be applied to real software automatically to minimize the
human involvement in their deployment to protect systems.
Chapter 3 introduced stack protection policies that carry forward information from the
compiler about correct program behavior to enforce at runtime with tags and rules. The
dominant source of overhead for these policies was the cost of tagging and clearing stack
frames, which led us to design the lazy tagging policy engineering technique to reduce those
costs; as a result, we find that object-level stack protection can be enforced at a cost of less
than 5%.
In Chapter 4 we explore policies to protect the heap. We show that many common classes
of heap errors can be defeated with the One-Color policy or the Allocation-Site policy with
a single color at only 1% overhead. Full temporal and spatial heap safety can typically be
provided at less than 10%, but some workloads can challenge the rule cache; we show how
to relax the policies to reduce this overhead while maintaining useful security properties by
cycling through pools of colors by allocation site.
Lastly, in Chapter 5 we show how high-performance compartmentalization policies can be
constructed. For good performance on the PUMP, the number of rules required for each
program phase should cache favorably; we introduce rule packing, a method to reduce the
set of rules required by compartmentalization policies into working sets that achieve the
targeted cache performance. To decide how to relax the compartmentalizations to achieve
these goals, we introduce a quantitative privilege metric and a set of analysis tools that
treat compartment generation as an optimization problem to automate the construction of
compartmentalization policies. These allow a security engineer to quickly instantiate and
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evaluate tag-based compartmentalization policies. Lastly, we design and evaluate a rule
prefetching system that can reduce the enforcement costs of compartmentalization policies
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